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INTRODUCTION
WE ARE ALL KHALED SAIEED

“The huge thing with Khaled Saieed w asn’t his picture after he got killed. It was his
picture before he got killed. A little innocent-looking guy who looks like your son, your
cousin, your nephew. That’s what galvanized people...Khaled Saieed showed the middle
class th a t.b ein g silent and minding their own business wouldn’t protect them.”~
Mahmoud Salem, aka Sandmonkey
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On June 6, 2010 in the seaside Cleopatra district of Alexandria, Egypt, twentyeight year old Khaled Saieed unintentionally became a revolutionary rallying point for
the citizens of Egypt. The night of June 6th around 11 o’clock Saieed was brutally
murdered by a couple of plainclothes policemen. Haitham Mesbah, Saieed’s close friend,
recalls his last moments as immediate, terrifying, and violent. The instant Khaled Saieed
walked into the Space Net Cybercafe, located down the street from his apartment, he was
immediately grabbed by the back of his neck by two plainclothes police officers.
According to Hassan Mesbah, Haitham’s father and owner of the Space Net Cybercafe,
Khaled was shouting “What do you want? Don’t grab me like this!” Before he could
finish his sentence one o f the officers slammed his head into the hard marble counter
(Khali, 2011, p. 73). The policemen continued to drag Saieed outside into the foyer of an
apartment building continually banging his head into metal doorways and slamming his
head into the concrete floor. Mohammed Naieem, a witness to the beating, remarks how
the officers spent twenty minutes kicking Saieed and slamming his head down as he
pleaded for mercy (Khali, 2011, p. 73). Yet, despite Saieed’s pleading the beating did not
end.
As the policemen beat Khaled Saieed a crowd began to form in the streets. When
some o f the neighbors tried to interfere with the policemen the officers shouted, “Anyone
who interferes will go in his place” (Khali, 2011, p. 74). Other people within the crowd
began to reply for them to mind their own business and allow the policemen to carry on
with their work. Khaled Saieed went limp and the policemen continued to beat him when
Mohammed Naieem told the officers that the boy was dead. The officers denied his
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remark and remained relentless in beating the lifeless body. According to witnesses a
local physician walked to the scene and managed to inspect the body proclaiming that the
man was dead (Khalil, 2011, p. 74). Once the officers finally realized that Saieed was
dead they began to take systematic damage-control steps.
One of the officers made a call to a senior police officer who arrived at the scene
and loaded Khaled’s body into their car. Hassan Mesbah remembers how they took the
body and came back with a dozen more officers tossing the body back into the area where
he was first pronounced as dead (Khalil, 2011). Around midnight an ambulance was
finally called to the scene. When the ambulance arrived, they at first refused to take the
body stating that removing the corpse was a job for the coroner’s office. Haitham Mesbah
witnessed the exchange and says that the senior officer had to bully him into compliance
loading the body into the back of the ambulance (Khalil, 2011). Later in the morning,
Saieed’s family was taken to the morgue to identify the body. When identifying the body
one o f the relatives used a camera phone and took a picture of the body that will remain
an important symbol within the history of Egypt.
The picture taken from the morgue speaks of violence and horror. The picture that
can be accessed from the internet depicts a deformed and broken face with teeth missing
and blood caked onto the side of his face and pooling beneath his head. The second
picture, along with the one taken from his death, is a generic one taken from his passport.
The picture is one of a common modern Egyptian. This picture portrays an innocent man
who can resemble your son, grandson, nephew, or cousin. By social media outlets,
specifically Wael Ghonim’s “We are all Khaled Saieed” Facebook page, and mobile
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phones the picture was distributed throughout Egypt and globally. The recognition of
Khaled being a common man created a common identity for the Egyptians to rally around
as they began to understand that even the most common man cannot be protected from
the brutality of the police state under the regime of Mubarak. The death of Khaled Saieed
and the distribution o f his photographs was one o f the final catalysts that sparked mass
protests demanding for President Hosni Mubarak to resign.
As Khaled’s pictures went viral within days, jumping from the online activists to
ordinary citizens, a common Egyptian identity was beginning to form. Over Facebook
Khaled Saieed’s picture became others’ avatars—the embodiment of a person or idea that
represents the online user—and attention to the case via social media networks began to
leak out to mainstream newspapers and mass media. With both social media networks
and mass media covering the case extensively, more people were becoming aware of the
situation to the point where there were few people in Egypt who did not know who
Khaled Saieed was. Furthermore, the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Saieed”
became a gathering point for many activists and organizers of the protest. Social media
was not only used to create a common space, but also as a communication tool for people
to converse and identify themselves within the movement.
The picture of Khaled Saieed became the defining image of the uprisings
occurring within Egypt. Communication was a significant component within the
Egyptian Revolutions as the streets were filled with young men and women holding up
their BlackBerry phones to snap photos of the protests, to tweet their involvement on the
social network site Twitter, as well as receive updated information through Facebook.
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This modern technique of communicating enhanced cooperative participation from the
citizens throughout the country enabling collective action to occur.
This thesis will begin by discussing the events of Mubarak’s presidency leading
up to the Egyptian Revolution in order to gain insight on the intrinsic motivations that are
necessary for the citizens of Egypt to voluntarily participate within the Revolution. The
frustration and anger witnessed throughout Mubarak’s regime helped to determine
whether or not the citizens would collectively act. The debate o f collective action has
existed since Mancur Olson’s commonly known “zero contribution thesis” (Ostrom,
2000). Olson’s accepted theory of collective action has stated that individuals will not
collectively act unless a group is small or there is coercion to force individuals to act
(Ostrom, 2000). Although this theory is extremely popular among scholars, this theory
has been disproved through countless game theory experiments arguing that not all
individuals are rational or act on self-interest. Many scholars have found that individuals
will act based on how many other people are acting, as well as on how much information
is received. Although the theories of collective action have strived to examine how
people are motivated to act for a common goal, these theories alone are inadequate to
contemplate how quickly the Egyptian citizens were able to organize and push for
Mubarak’s resignation.
Social movement theories and collective action concepts are both necessary
notions to examine in correlation to the Egyptian Revolution. These notions help to
reveal the impact social media had on the communication and identification process
within the protests and overall revolution in Tahrir Square. Social media had an essential
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role in enabling Egyptians to communicate and form a common identity among one
another, dissolving a psychological fear of the regime and developing an open space for
conversation. However, the role of social media should not indicate that the Egyptian
Revolution was in fact a “Facebook Revolution” (Aouragh, 2012). Rather, social media
was the means for the Egyptian population to communicate, organize, and form a
common end goal. The willingness of a vast number of people to become physically
engaged in the protests enabled for the demands o f the people to be heard—Mubarak
resigned February 11, 2012, just eighteen days after the Revolution started. Social media
networks contributed to over three thousands likes of the “We Are All Khaled Saieed”
Facebook page, and the action of the government denying access to the Internet
contributed to over a million individuals physically protesting within Tahrir Square.
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CHAPTER 1
THE RISE OF EGYPT OUT OF MUBARAK’S REIGN

“We have started an uprising with the will o f the people, the people who have suffered
fo r thirty years under oppression, injustice, and poverty. Egyptians have proven today
that they are capable o f taking freedom by force and destroying despotism. ” ~Egyptian
pamphlets distributed among protesters
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Mohammed Hosni Mubarak began his career in May 1928 when he entered into
the military to serve in the Egyptian Air Force (Khalil, 2011). As a fighter pilot and
aviation instructor serving in the military, Mubarak was eventually promoted to
commander of the Egyptian Air Force (Khalil, 2011, p. 9). He was praised as a war hero
in October of 1973 when the former President Anwar Sadat attacked across the Suez
Canal into the Sinai Peninsula occupied by Israeli forces. The conflict between Egypt and
Israel could have ended in a military deadlock and by the time a ceasefire could be
declared the Israeli forces would have advanced on Cairo (Khalil, 2011). However, the
strategic surprise attack shocked Israeli personal to the point where Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat was able to negotiate terminating any opportunity for Israeli forces to
advance on Cairo. Sadat was able to begin open peace negotiations with Israel that
resulted in the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel on November 20, 1977 (Khalil,
2011). Sadat then continued to use Mubarak as the face of victory for the conflict,
promoting him to Vice President in the year of 1975.
Despite the attempt to have peace between Egypt and Israel, the Campy David
Peace Accords ultimately made Egypt a regional outcast to other Arab countries. The
Peace Accords placed Egypt in the American camp during the Cold War that ensured
billions of dollars’ worth of aid from the United States (Khalil, 2011). However, this deal
led to the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League in 1979, secluding Egypt from the
Arab world. Domestically, Sadat imprisoned more than fifteen hundred dissidents
including Islamists and activists who criticized his rulings. On October 6, 1981, during a
parade to memorialize Sadat’s military victory in 1973, President Anwar Sadat was killed
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by an Islamist group within his own army (Khalil, 2011). After the assassination of Sadat,
Mubarak became president and the Egyptian people cautiously accepted him as the leader
o f their country.
At the beginning of Mubarak’s reign he immediately released the dissidents that
were imprisoned and pledged to stay in power for no more than two presidential terms
(Khalil, 2011). During his first presidential term Mubarak began to take positive steps in
moving the country forward by hosting a conference of prominent economists to design a
new economic vision, launching an anticorruption campaign, imprisoning several regimeconnected businessmen including Sadat’s brother (Khalil, 2011). However, domestically
Mubarak faced threats from militant Islamist groups, as well as infrastructure issues.
Numerous infrastructure issues were solved and the significant amount of debt that
accumulated during the 1980s was forgiven by Mubarak’s foreign policy with the United
States. After the Persian Gulf War, the United States and Europe collectively forgave
Egypt approximately $20 billion of debt as a reward for participating within the AntiSaddam Hussein alliance. The increasing dependence on United States aid to solve
numerous infrastructure issues, as well as the increasing seclusion from the rest of the
Arab world began to stir up domestic opposition.
Despite limited domestic opposition, Mubarak and the National Democratic Party
(NDP) held the popular vote within the executive and legislative branches of the
government. Along with Mubarak’s re-elections the Emergency Laws were repeatedly
renewed. The Emergency Laws, first imposed by Sadat, grant the President sweeping
powers to arrest and detain anyone that they feel may be a threat. Throughout Mubarak’s
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rule there were various degrees of oppression and injustice that highlighted Mubarak’s
relationship with Egyptian citizens. Mubarak treated the people of Egypt with contempt
ultimately taking away their dignity, respect for themselves, and the idea that they could
change their own situation. Through Mubarak’s reign, the people of Egypt began to lose
their self-identity. Ashraf Khalil, the author of Liberation Square, writes that Mubarak’s
reign had a corrosive effect on Egyptian society. Mubarak:
Took a proud and ancient civilization and presided over the virtual collapse of its
citizens’ sense of public empowerment and political engagement. He taught them
how to feel helpless, then made them forget they had ever felt any other way. His
reign spread cynicism, apathy, and eventually, self-loathing (Khalil, 2011, p. 22).
The government of Egypt worked to make the people feel that trying to change their
circumstances would prove to be futile. Generations of people growing up under
Mubarak’s were instilled with the ideal that the only way they could go about their lives
was to “walk next to the wall” or in general to keep their heads down and stay out of
government affairs (Khalil, 2011, p. 22). The government eventually demoralized the
people, putting them in desperate situations that backfired and worked as a means for the
people to collectively organize themselves. Pre-revolutionary, there were several
moments along with the death of Khaled Saieed that would motivate the people to action.
Events that would begin to turn the tide were in response to the unchallenged law
and actions of the police. The power of the police began to grow after the Luxor
Massacre on November 17, 1997. In the temple of Queen Hatshepsut in southern Egypt,
Islamist gunmen killed over fifty tourists, a tour guide, and a couple of police officers
(Khalil, 2011). Although Egypt has a reputation as an effective police state, the response
from local forces was incredibly slow costing the lives of tourists and negatively
10

affecting the tourism in the Khan al-Khalili bazaar. In the aftermath of the massacre,
Mubarak quickly responded by publicly firing the Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfy and
replacing him with the new Interior Minister Habib al-Adly. New Interior Minister AlAdly was given permission to secure the state from any Islamist threats, essentially
leading to the coercive power of the police and State Security influencing all institutions.
Under the Emergency Laws many people were targeted and institutions were told how to
be run by the State Security. Ashraf Khalil writes:
With no real checks on their behavior, the internal culture of Egypt’s security
forces deteriorated rapidly. Supported on paper by the Emergency Laws and
backed by the full power of all aspects of the government, the police devolved
into Egypt’s largest and most heavily armed criminal mob. The entire relationship
of the police to society changed and warped (Khalil, 2011, p. 26).
The police became oppressors limiting the amount people could participate within the
government and essentially protecting the regime rather than the people themselves. The
police were fueling resentment from the civilians that would continue to build leading up
and acknowledged throughout the revolution.
Along with the police force growing other events occurred that would continue to
turn the tide. In September 1999, the National Democratic Party controlled Parliament
and was to present a candidate in what would be a “national yes [or] no referendum”
(Khalil, 2011, p. 29). Mubarak was re-nominated by a vote of 445-0—taken from the
National Democratic Party as a yes or no referendum—and the media was presenting
Mubarak as the war hero from the 1973 conflict and the father of the nation (Khalil,
2011). Mubarak’s campaign depicted a national consensus of saying “yes” to his
presidency, whereas in reality the nation, demoralized under his reign, felt like all the
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choice in the matter was taken away from them. The government worked to make sure
that no other candidate would prove to be a better option than Mubarak. However, this
election would prove to be the last one that people felt indifferent as events began to
unfold questioning and doubting Mubarak’s reign.
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a sociology professor teaching at the American University in
Cairo, was detained and prosecuted by the State Security for various crimes such as
accepting foreign funding without attaining any government permission, as well as
seeking to impair upon Egypt’s international reputation (Khalil, 2011). Ibrahim’s case
kept being referred back to a specially created court under the State Security and
eventually entered the main legal system on appeal. Twice, under the State Security court
Ibrahim was sentenced to prison and twice the case was appealed and dismissed. This
specific case would be highlighted by the media as they depicted NGOs similar to the Ibn
Khaldoun Center as being merely puppets for foreign interest. The Ibn Khaldoun Center
for Development Studies, under Ibrahim, was producing a film funded by the European
Union to encourage voter participation in parliamentary elections for the upcoming fall
(Khalil, 2011).
The Ibn Khaldoun Center was one of many NGOs that were training people for
election monitors. According to many people working in the NGOs the arrest of Ibrahim
was designed to warn other NGOs to not become involved in politics let alone the
upcoming election in the fall (Khalil, 2011). However, despite the warning the arrest and
court case o f Ibrahim also illustrated the growing number of NGOs and civil society
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groups that were emerging across the state. These actors would prove to be important in
the construction of social movement and collective action.
In the early years of the 2000s, activists were able to conduct small protests
organized around foreign policy issues. More often than not, the protests were broken
apart by the State Security or by the Central Security—the troops of the Interior Ministry
(Khalil, 2011). Numerous citizens began to become more and more frustrated with the
presence o f the Israeli Army, specifically conflicts against the Palestinian youth (Khalil,
2011), and an embassy within Cairo. While there was growing unrest among the civilians
a strong social movement could not be formed as many of the activists had differing
opinions. With no centralized movement and citizens too afraid to participate in
correlation with the activists, the security forces were able to limit the unrest and control
the small protests. Amidst the protesters the internal conflict centered on the question of
who was to be blamed—were they angry against Israel or the Mubarak regime?
Along with no centralized movement there was a lack of group identity and
minimal participation. The majority of the Egyptian civilians refused to participate in the
protests with the Palestinians and go against the government. Many of the demonstrators
were young students protesting within the boundaries of Cairo University’s campus. One
day when Central Security officers chased protestors down the street a local man reported
to Ashraf Khalil that “if we [the Egyptian people] had any dignity, we would be with
them” (Khalil, 2011, p. 38). With that small recognition the group identity was beginning
to be recognized; however, participation would renain to be an important element in
maintaining the activists’ protests. The Central Security forces would always outweigh
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the protestors in numbers easily taking the advantage and becoming proficient in
dismantling the demonstrations. An increased amount of participation from all members
o f the Egyptian society is needed in order for there to be a social movement that will be
sustainable and strong enough to cause change within the country.
March 20, 2003 became a day that foreshadowed the revolution that would occur
eight years later. When the United States-led coalitions invaded Iraq, enraged Egyptian
protestors overwhelmed the security forces and took over Tahrir Square (Khalil, 2011).
As Mubarak gave the United States the permission to use the Suez Canal as a position to
invade Iraq, many of the civilians in Egypt saw that as a means for U.S. expansionism.
Angry and frustrated citizens took to the streets and for the first time under the reign of
Mubarak the Central Security was outnumbered. This was the first time that the anger
and frustration from the foreign policy issues was redirected at the regime. That night the
protestors tore down a poster of Mubarak hanging from the National Democratic Party’s
headquarters just outside of Tahrir Square (Khalil, 2011). The hostility for the
imperialistic movement o f America invading Iraq turned to Mubarak as people began to
want and demand for his resignation. That was the beginning of the end to any legitimacy
Mubarak might have claimed and the start to opposition parties forming and beginning to
be recognized.
An opposition movement that emerged in the summer of 2004 was the Kefaya
movement meaning “Enough” (Khalil, 2011).The goal and focus of the movement was to
prevent Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak, from succeeding him. The movement branded
themselves and advertised under yellow stickers with the one-worded slogan “Enough.”
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In the years of 2004 and 2005, the movement formed a couple of protests that was
highlighted by mass media exaggerating the group’s efforts against Gamal Mubarak.
Although the group made mass media news, it failed to connect and form a local group
identity with the remaining Egyptian population. Without recognition from the Egyptian
population the group could not sustain itself and ended up disbursing. While the
movement proved to be unsuccessful, many o f the leftist activists continued to remain
politically active and the fear to directly chant against the dictator was eliminated.
Al-Masry Al-Youm, a large independently-owned newspaper, stated that there
were approximately nineteen hundred separate labor actions that involved more than 1.7
million workers across Egypt (Khalil, p. 51-52). Two years following the Kefaya
movement there was the April 6th movement that was first recognized for its use of social
media by the youth. On April 6th workers at “Egypt’s largest textile factory in the Nile
Delta city of Mahalla al-Kubra engaged riot police in two days of violent clashes”
(Khalil, p. 51). Egyptian workers angered by the government’s push to privatize stateowned industries, the rising cost of living, and unchanging salaries became motivated to
react and openly protest. On April 6, 2008 the Mahalla dispute became a premeditated
plan to strike on the factory floor of the state-owned Misr Spinning and Weaving
Company. The premeditated plan was initiated and police attempts to break up the strike
turned extremely violent. The clashes left two dead and dozens injured primarily from the
security forces using both stun guns and live ammunition to diminish the protest.
From the April 6th Movement, many youthful activists used Facebook to organize
demonstrations. The youth used social media to form what can be categorized as cat and
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mouse quick strike actions—the protestors would appear to protest and then be gone
before the police could arrive (Campbell, 2011). The actions and protests would be
filmed and later publicized on YouTube where other Internet activists would post the
footage onto their Facebook page in order to show the growing unrest in Egypt. Despite
the Kefaya movement breaking down political barriers, the Mahalla dispute was the first
that the country saw a protest bridge together politics and economics.
A popular satellite news channel, A l Jazeera, filmed the workers at the Mahalla
dispute tearing down posters of Mubarak. The network ran the footage for a day and was
immediately threatened by the government. The government responded to these
movements by banning all political organizations making it illegal for more than five
people to gather. Simultaneously, newspapers were increasingly monitored by the
Ministry of Information in order to censor information criticizing Mubarak (Campbell,
2011). However, in running the footage, A l Jazeera contributed greatly to linking the
grievances from one city in Egypt to another. The Mahalla dispute became a national
issue sparking activity from multiple labor organizations that continued throughout the
revolution. With strikes and protests now occurring monthly, the legitimacy of
Mubarak’s reign began to dwindle.
As Mubarak’s legitimacy grew weaker, online activists began to increase building
a virtual community where they could find each other. Within this virtual space activists
were able to discuss politics and present a sense of hope that was lost within the non
politicized community of Egypt. Throughout Mubarak’s reign the culture of Egypt
became more and more violent and harsh. “As the citizens internalized the realities of a
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society with almost no reliable and uncorrupted institutions, Egyptians began to
genuinely forget about the concept of right and wrong, or justice under the law” (Khalil,
2011, p. 56). Conversations and arguments began to evolve into power games where
“wusta”—influence or connections—were emphasized (Khalil, 2011, p. 56). A wealthy
business woman commented to Ashraf Khalil that, “Mubarak destroyed Egypt. He
destroyed the morals and the conscience of the people” (Khalil, 2011, p. 56). Young
adults were graduating from college with no jobs and forced to live back at home,
essentially stuck from continuing on with their lives—not having any opportunities to
move out, buy an apartment, get married, and have children of their home. Many were
becoming angry at a permanent state of emergency law, rampant police abuses, and a
sixty percent unemployment rate (Campbell, 2011). These societal problems ultimately
fueled the desperation, internalized rages, and utter hopelessness of the people.
One o f the final rallying points leading to the revolution was the death of Khaled
Saieed. Similar to how Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in December of 2010
fueled the Arab Spring in Tunisian, Saieed’s death added to the growing grievances in
Egypt leading to the escalation of protest activity. The self-immolation of Mohammed
Bouazizi took place in the central of a Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid that triggered the
unfolding of tragic events being leaked on social networking sites (Beaumont, 2011).
Communicating via social media became a transformative event for the Arab Spring as
the circumstances in Tunisian were being identified as part of a “Twitter Revolution”
(Beaumont, 2011). The citizens of Tunisian believed that the footage and video being
uploaded onto the internet gave them credibility and assurance as to why their revolts
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were successful. However, Twitter was only a part of the pre-revolutionary stage in
Tunisian. Within the pre-revolutionary stage there was only 200 active tweeters out of
over 2,000 accounts, yet activists within the Twitter group were able to communicate to
the Facebook group fueling participation (Beaumont, 2011). Overall, social media was
crucial to the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary stages within Tunisia as everybody saw
images of Bouazizi’s self-immolation.
Although Khaled Saieed was not the first ordinary citizen to be killed by the
Security State or even to have documentation of his death spread virally via Facebook
and Twitter, Saieed was the first man to be killed that everyone could relate to.
Mohammed El Dahshan quoted to Ashraf Khalil that, “people could relate to that guy
more than they could relate to some microbus driver. Before that, people could always
brush [police brutality cases] off by saying ‘Well, he must have done something to begin
with if he was in the police station’” (Khalil, 2011, p. 77). The microbus driver refers to
the case where police forces viciously sodomized Emad al-Kebir (Human Rights Watch,
2007). In the article “Egypt: Bus Driver Raped by Police Faces New Risk of Torture,”
Emad al-Kebir recalls how the police circulated a video of his rape to break down his
spirit (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Activists would also circulate the video as a rallying
point for NGOs similar to the Human Rights Watch in Egypt; however, the rallying point
ended with the two police officers sentenced to three-years. The fact that Saieed was so
young and there was essentially no reasoning behind his attack fueled the anger and
frustration people in Egypt had been experiencing throughout Mubarak’s reign. However,
it was revealed later that in June of 2010, Khaled Saieed filmed a group of policemen in
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Alexandria dividing the proceeds of a drug deal and later posted this video on Facebook
(Campbell, 2011). The reasoning of his attack was in consequence to his capability to
access the Internet and display the corruption of the police force in Egypt. Saieed’s death
became a common point for people to find solidarity as each person was enraged by the
emergency laws and the unchallenged power of the police.
As social media and mainstream newspapers began to cover the case of Saieed’s
death, more and more people spoke out against the Security State giving interviews and
details about the case. Furthermore, international human rights organizations and local
citizens began to demand a proper investigation and a permanent repeal of the emergency
laws. With the story going viral and spreading not only nationally, but also
internationally, there were weeks of demonstrations occurring across Egypt. Some of the
demonstrations consisted of flash-mob-style tactics and live streaming videos of protests
(Khalil, 2011). One memorable demonstration was a silent vigil where participants
wearing black stood in a line along the Nile in Giza. For the first time, under these
demonstrations, people became focused targeting their anger and frustration against
police violence.
As the police report about Khaled Saieed took form, there was no mention of any
kind of beating that could have been facilitated by the civilian-clothed police officers.
Instead the police report stated that Saieed was a criminal who choked to death on a
packet of hashish that he proceeded to swallow when he noticed the police officers
approaching him (Khalil, 2011). The coroner’s report backed-up the police officers
statements never pointing out how the pictures of Saieed depicted a man with a broken
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nose, a broken jaw, and blood pooling beneath his head. In response to the first report
many protests were formulated leading to a second autopsy of the body. However, the
second autopsy confirmed the first report and added that Saieed must have collided with
blunt objects while trying to run from the police, therefore causing his severe injuries.
“No one looking at the photos could reasonably believe, as the government claimed,
Saieed had died choking whilst trying to swallow/conceal a packet of hashish”
(Campbell, 2011, p. 30). With the government dismissing the case existing organizations
began to mobilize and consequently new movements were made.
When a month went by, the government decided to put the two officers,
Mahmoud and Suleiman, on trial (Khalil, 2011). The two officers stuck to the same story
contradicting physical evidence, as well as multiple accounts from eye-witnesses. Officer
Mahmoud testified that Saieed was “wanted in two cases of theft and possession of a
knife” (Khalil, 2011, p. 84). He continues to testify that there was never any violence
used against Saieed and that the man choked to death without anyone ever touching him.
Mahmoud claims that, “He was holding something in his hand. When I tried to take it
from him, he put it in his mouth and swallowed it. Then he fell on the ground and his legs
started to shake violently” (Khalil, 2011, p. 84). Both the police and the coroner’s report
persistently denied that violence or force was ever used on Khaled Saieed. As the case
continued to move throughout the court system the government worked to officially
dismiss the case and sweep it under the rug.
In order to patch things up and calm the civilians Gamal Mubarak, Mubarak’s
son, made a statement that the National Democratic Party insisted that any wrongdoer be
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hold accountable for their actions under the rule of law (Khalil, 2011). The government
also issued stories within the newspapers about Saieed’s criminal record including
written reports on drug dealing. The newspaper, The Arab Nation, contained a segment
on Khaled, his family, and the multiple eye-witnesses willing to testify against the
officers titled “The Marijuana Martyr” (Khalil, 2011). The attempt to smooth things over
and portray Khaled as wrongdoer needing to be held accountable eventually backfired for
the government as more people began to understand that fighting against the regime was
necessary for their everyday survival. Wael Khalil reports to Ashraf Khalil that, “what
Khaled’s case did was get people involved who didn’t view what they were doing as
politics. They saw it simply as doing the right thing” (Khalil, 2011, p. 81). Khaled’s death
and the cover-up o f how he died helped to politicize enormous amounts of numbers in
Egypt and encouraging ordinary citizens to attend demonstrations.
Three weeks after the death of Khaled Saieed, in June 2010, there was a protest
against police brutality in Alexandria. This protest contained people who admitted to it
being the first protest they have ever attended—the protest was larger and angrier with
approximately three thousand people (Khalil, 2011). For the first time people began to
care about politics and become active within their own state. After the Khaled Saieed
case and his post-mortem picture going viral through social media networks the whole
country began to move and collectively act. The death of Khaled Saieed was fresh in the
minds o f the youth and in using the hatred for the police the people of Egypt began to
organize January 25th as the Day of Rage (Campbell, 2011).
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Mancur Olson, a leading American economists and social scientist, argued that
unless there is a small percentage of individuals or there is coercion, people will not
collectively work together to reach a common goal. However, the Egyptian Revolution
accounted for over one million people protesting against the presidency of Mubarak. In
examining the Egyptian Revolution along with other theories of collective action, it
becomes clear that Olson’s argument is inadequate in explaining how people in reality
organize for change. Furthermore, the elements of communication and collective identity
must also be considered when analyzing how people collectively act and work together to
reach a common goal.
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CHAPTER 2
CLASSICAL ARGUMENTS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION;
Notions on how individuals will naturally self-organize to reach a common end goal

“As Egyptians, one o f our problems is that we don’t know how to work together.” ~Maha
Elgamal
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The Egyptian Revolution, first inspired by the self-immolation of Mohammed
Bouazizi in central Tunisian and the cruel death of Khaled Saieed in Egypt, led to
widespread anti-government uprisings throughout the Middle East becoming the Arab
Spring. The defining movement is characterized by individuals utilizing technology in
order to enhance communication and ultimately act collectively. Social media networks
like Facebook and Twitter enabled like-minded groups to speak with one another, when
organizing and assembling on the streets resulted in arrest or detention (Campbell, 2011).
Social media platforms became vehicles for communication and mobilization allowing
for a vast number o f people to organize and act towards a distinguished end goal, defying
Mancur Olson’s argument on collective action. Beginning with Mancur Olson’s
argument in 1965, the discussion of collective action or how people have come to
understand the theory has existed for the past quarter of the century as scholars strive to
identify key elements to why people will work together to form change.
Mancur Olson’s theory, commonly known as the “zero contribution thesis” by
scholars like Elinor Ostrom, was made in disagreement with a naively optimistic notion
that groups will naturally self-organize when there is joint interest or shared interest
(Ostrom, 2000). The discussion has continued since Mancur Olson’s concept of
collective action with well-known scholars disproving the notion that all people are
ultimately rational and self-interested and would thereby not participate unless forced or
within small groups. Recent studies and experiments have revealed that there are intrinsic
motivations existing when people decide to voluntarily participate in collective action.
Furthermore, Mancur Olson’s classical argument remains inadequate in today’s society
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due to increasing technology that enables individuals to gain information and
communicate with one another.
The popular argument of collective action made by Mancur Olson in 1965
emphasizes the problems o f individuals contributing to the group that involves some
public good or outcome. Achieving the public good or outcome would be better attained
by forging a common cause or containing a joint interest; however, Mancur Olson argued
that unless the number o f individuals in a group is small or there is coercion to force
individuals to act within the common interest, self-interested individuals will not act
together (Udehn, 1993). Mancur Olson predicted that a member of large group would not
voluntarily participate within a movement even if that movement could support a group’s
common interest including that of the individual (Jones, 2007). In large-scale groups
individual contributions are less noticeable and allow self-interested individuals to freeride on the efforts of others while receiving all of the benefits. To free-ride is to receive
benefits without paying or contributing to any of the costs (Ostrom, 2000). Therefore, it
would be more cost-efficient not to contribute anything because one can enjoy all of the
benefits without making any sacrifices (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012,). Secondly, if there
are not enough people contributing then the efforts made to contribute would be wasted
reaffirming the position of the free-rider.
Olson’s argument surrounds the ideal of the rational egotist who will not act in the
common interest due to it being cost-inefficient. Furthermore, the temptation to free-ride
ultimately prevents individuals from choosing to contribute to the group without
receiving benefits or rewards (Ostrom, 2000). The individual, therefore, finds it to be in
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his or hers best interest to not contribute since others can free-ride and their contribution
would ultimately go unnoticed (Jones, 2007). The solution Mancur Olson offers to
motivate people to contribute to the collective action is coercion or selective incentives.
Selective incentives are benefits that are only available to those participating within a
group. These incentives can be economic, political, or social increasing one’s status or
prestige. For instance, a selective incentive can include insurance or reaffirmation that
they will receive a reward and recognition for their contribution.
Olson’s overall argument relies upon the assumption that all individuals
will act rationally and self-interested—the individual will not contribute to the group
because they are rational and aware that there are others who would free-ride rather than
actively participate. Nonetheless, in correlation to Olson’s solution, by creating selective
incentives in order to encourage or force others to contribute there will eventually arise
another dilemma. The incentives created and enforced would become costly to those
providing the incentives and the benefits would not only be received by cooperatives, but
also free riders (Ostrom, 2000). Although Mancur Olson illustrates that self-interest is
not enough for people to be motivated for collective action his call for incentives simply
encourages people more easily when they are participating within smaller groups (Udehn,
1993). Olson believes that “as the size of the group increases, there is a decrease both in
the relative importance of each individual’s contribution and in each individual’s share of
the value of the collective good for the group as a whole” (Udehn, 1993, p. 240).
As the group size increases, the overall change in the outcome becomes less
noticeable and the benefits for individuals to participate will decrease. Corresponding to
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less benefits, individuals will begin to question why they should act at all when their own
actions will go unnoticed and not be perceptible to the end goal (Jones, 2007). Whether
or not a person’s actions are perceptible within a collective movement becomes a primary
distinction between large and small groups. Within the large group specifically the
individual does not highly benefit and therefore does not fully support or participate in
the collective group diminishing any noticeable difference to be made towards the
common good.
According to Mancur Olson’s argument, individuals living within Egypt would
not want to participate within the protests because their contribution would remain
unknown and the risks o f becoming arrested and detained outweighed the common
interest of the group. In order for the majority of the Egyptian population to want to
participate within the protests, activists would need to relay on a form of coercion to
motivate and mobilize people. Mancur Olson claimed that for any change to exist or
benefits to be accumulated, large groups would need to rely on coercion in order to
secure cooperation. Therefore, coercion, sanctions, and other selective incentives
become significant in securing support for the movement.
Olson developed a ‘by-product theory’ of pressure groups declaring that if the
common good is not enough to motivate people to join the movement, then they have to
organize around another purpose or motive (Udehn, 1993). Once more Olson is assuming
that self-interest is not enough to assemble people collectively and that there needs to be
an activist or political leader to set up sanctions or incentives to fully mobilize people.
Contrary to small groups, the activists or political leader is more essential to encourage
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people to act within large groups and display the appearance that each individual is
making a difference towards the end goal. Social control becomes effective by these
leaders pointing out the importance of the identified selective incentives that are usually
social concepts including: class status, prestige, and social pressure norms (Udehn, 1993).
In utilizing the selective incentives, the individual primarily acts rationally while working
within the large group.
In participating within the group, each individual will receive a type of gain or
benefit. Olson’s argument has clarified that the individual’s benefit will decrease as the
group size increases making participation likewise decrease. Consequently, collective
goods become another means of influencing individual participation within the group.
Collective goods are characterized by a necessary condition of jointness, as well as non
excludability (Udehn, 1993). “Non-excludability makes for free-riding and works against
the provision of public goods” and jointness tends to “increase the probability that
collective goods will be provided” (Udehn, 1993, p. 241). Under the terms of jointness
the utility o f a person is not grounded within the common good and cannot be diminished
as other people use the good; therefore, individual benefit is independent from the group.
Rather than focus on jointness as part of his argument, Olson emphasized non
excludability in order to support his free-rider notion working against meeting any
common good. Unlike non-excludability, jointness increases collective goods that are
designed to ultimately increase the benefits of participating in the group while
diminishing the risks.
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In circumstances where the provisions of collective goods depend upon a protest
or revolt, there can be increasing returns of scale (Udehn, 1993). Revolutions, petitions,
or demonstrations depend on the numbers of people actively participating within the
social movement. In order to place pressure on the social issues or to reach the common
good the movements require a vast number of people. The large numbers of movements
can act as a social mechanism to persuade more people to join the group. The ability to
apply pressure on people to conform within the group becomes a vital point as individual
benefit will rise with the group size—contrary to Olson’s belief of individual behavior in
large groups. Furthermore, social control is more difficult to achieve in large collective
groups, as well as achieving any conditional cooperation. We cannot assume from
Olson’s argument that every individual has a common interest. Rather, individuals have
complex interests and more importantly diverse resources to allow them to acquire their
interests.
The research prepared by Mancur Olson was not intended to be applied to non
economic groups because, according to Olson, collective action within social, political, or
religious mass movements are irrational. Olson’s argument is focused on individuals
seeking an investment from the common good. Olson critiques the aspect of groups
naturally self-organizing revealing that individuals will not act collectively because they
have similar feelings or ideals. Rather, Olson makes the distinction between common and
individual interests stating that individuals might be aware of the common interests, but
have no incentive to express identity with these common interests (Jones, 2007).
Therefore, individuals have the possibility to derive utility from the action that correlates
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to a common identity, but remain unwilling to incur the costs of the collective action
(Jones, 2007). Olson acknowledges that moral incentives exist when organizing social,
political, or religious movements, yet, he maintains that an individual acting rationally
will not commit to a large group because their individual benefit would decrease as the
group sizes increase (Udehn, 1993). Although his argument was intended for economic
groups, Mancur’s distinction between individual and common interests plays a vital role
in the discussion o f identity and intrinsic values within social movements that are derived
from collective action. Furthermore, other scholars have continued to analyze Olson’s
argument critiquing his work on the basis of what distinguishes a large and small group,
as well as the importance of communication when collectively acting.
Russell Hardin criticizes Olson’s analysis indicating that Olson assumes that
small groups are more privileged or manifested, whereas large groups are dormant or
inactive. Hardin points out that Olson assumes that the net or disposable benefit for
individuals unavoidably declines as the number of the group rises. Hardin argues that
there could be two circumstances where the net benefit becomes a decreasing “function
of group size” : “individual benefits decrease [and] individual costs increase” (Udehn,
1993, p. 241). In analyzing Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action, Hardin related the
issues to the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The question of how to avoid a situation where a rational individual’s decisions
leads to a collective irrationality is highlighted throughout the N-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (Udehn, 1993). Mancur Olson assumed that people would remain static
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game; however, Hardin points out that people in real life will
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meet again and again. Hardin continues to make the observation that when people
remember this meeting that memory becomes extremely important when developing
cooperation (Udehn, 1993). Michael Taylor also distinguished that collective action does
not work in pairs interacting; rather, an N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game would be
more adequate to depict numerous people interacting (Udehn, 1993).
The N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game established by Michael Taylor also has
some limitations. Taylor recognizes that for cooperation to occur there would need to be
‘conditional cooperators’—an individual’s cooperation is not dependent upon another’s;
however, there needs to be enough cooperation amongst the group in order to illicit more.
Another limit to the game is that it assumes people to be in a static environment. In order
to illustrate reality the game would need to develop a method that would be everchanging with the environment, the circumstances, and even the people playing the game.
A concept that is important within the Prisoner’s and N-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma games is the social interaction. Lars Udehn (1993) writes that “even though
collective action presupposes a common interest, members of the collective also have
diverging and more or less intense interests, and unequal resources to back them up (p.
244). Furthermore, in analyzing how people collectively act, an N-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma game was established assuming the players understood the logic of the
situation, had perfect information about the moves of other players, and could then
estimate the probability of meeting a pushover— or someone they could easily
manipulate—again and be recognized by that player (Udehn, 1993). These terms can only
be met where there is a high degree o f social control and the game is not being repeated
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under the same conditions. Referring back to Hardin’s distinction, it is important that
people continuously meet and that they remember each meeting. In order for people to
continuously meet they need to be engaged with overlapping activities and the people
who defect in one game are punished by exclusion from the group (Udehn, 1993).
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is correlated to Olson’s distinction between small and
large groups. According to Olson, if the group consisted of small individuals that tended
to be heterogeneous the group was therefore privileged; however, if the group tended to
be large individuals would need to rely on leadership or organizations in order to reach
their common goal (Udehn, 1993). Within a small-varied group, cooperation is possible
because there is a close proximity o f social interaction that is essential to solving the
problems of information becoming redundant, especially within the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game (Udehn, 1993).
The one aspect that is missing from the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as well as from
Mancur Olson’s argument, is the lack of communication. Communication is said to be
the most distinctive feature o f social life and can have a major impact when people are
acting collectively. Within the contemporary time period, the access to the internet and
other technological devices allows for society to communicate more easily than ever
before. Specifically with the aid of social media people from all over the world are able
to express themselves in a multitude of ways. Especially in consideration of
contemporary social movement the role of identity, culture, emotion, social networks,
political process, and opportunity structures have become more of a vital role (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2012). However, these roles cannot become manifest without the
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communication and networks that are formed between people. Mark Granovetter’s
analysis of collective action and behavior is important in understanding the behaviors and
motivations of people collectively acting.
In analyzing collective action or the behavior of people when they are acting
collectively, Mark Granovetter developed the notion of threshold, indicating that a
fundamental aspect of a social life is the ideal that an individual’s actions depend in
various ways on the actions of others (Udehn, 1993). Granovetter determined that
people’s decision on whether or not to participate within a movement depends on the
number of people already participating. This observation is in correlation to Olson’s
argument that the pressure of groups can be an effective mechanism for persuading
people to get involved. Granovetter continues to define an individual’s threshold as “the
number, or proportion, of others who must take action before” that individual does
(Udehn, 1993, p. 245).
When using the actions of others to base your decision to act allows for
Granovetter to assume that people are acting strategically. Strategic planning is
determined by the knowledge of the circumstances instead of on the “subjective
estimation of probabilities” (Udehn, 1993, p. 245). Granovetter’s model is sequential
where people know at every instant how many other people have joined in the movement
or collective action—people are acting on the basis that all the information is provided. In
order to foster his argument, Granovetter uses riots to show that people gain information
from their immediate surroundings and can gather how many people are already involved
within the movement. However, other information that is not within the immediate
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surroundings can be reduced to as merely rumors. From Granovetter’s analysis we
recognize that collective action may be “highly accidental, in the sense that small
differences in the distribution of thresholds in the population [can] make a big difference
to the aggregate outcome” (Udehn, 1993, p. 245). Therefore, one cannot deduce the
reliance on thresholds from the outcome.
Another aspect of Granovetter’s argument is the amount of social ties, as well as
structures of the networks within the population that influence how people participate.
Granovetter argues that “strong ties are possible only within small circles of friends,
whereas ties that connect small groups with one another are usually weak” (Udehn, 1993,
p. 246). However, weak ties are important within their possible function as channels for
the distribution of messages and ideals. Therefore, these weak ties can enhance the
capacity for communities to become involved within the collective action. Specifically,
weak ties have the capability to form from social media sites enabling people to be more
aware of ideals and information. Granovetter explicitly argues for strong ties that would
continue to influence the individual’s threshold as the person is more inclined to act with
a friend or someone that they have developed a close relationship with. This relationship
is a key point for individuals to come together for the same ideal (Udehn, p. 246).
Referring back to the N-Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the game was assuming that
the players understood the logic of the situation and overall contained all of the
information of what was happening and what would occur if certain elements were met.
The social ties and information received during the game allowed for individuals to
observe who was willing to collectively act and therefore, place all of their efforts

34

organizing around those individuals. Collective action no longer is just about the
investment as Olson described it, but also about intrinsic values developed through
interaction and collective identity among others.
In social dilemma situations many individuals follow norms of behavior that
reflect reciprocity, fairness, and trustworthiness in order to take action, therefore,
completely contradicting Olson’s argument (Ostrom, 2000). The behavior of individuals
is based on intrinsic preferences related to how they would prefer to behave to achieve
the benefits and avoid any of the harms that may exist. Elinor Ostrom (2000) makes the
distinction that some individuals act on these intrinsic preferences forming some
conditional cooperators who are willing to contribute to the collective action as long as
other people are contributing, while other individuals behave as rational egotists acting
towards their self-interest. When the individuals receive complete information about how
the other one may act they can begin to choose how they themselves want to act—further
emphasizing the role of intrinsic value.
An intrinsic value can be derived in various ways as individuals begin to believe
that they are acting with dignity. Through such a belief an individual’s self-esteem is
increased and they are intrinsically motivated to act where they feel good about the
activity and are not expecting a reward (Jones, 2007). Selective incentives then become a
flag, a badge, or a banner showing that the individual is associated with and overall feels
a part of that movement (Jones, 2007). Through intrinsic motivation, a person feels like
they belong to something bigger than themselves as they begin to form their identity.
Identity is used to describe a person’s social category and individuals define who they are

35

in terms o f who and how they interact with (Jones, 2007). Overall, individuals begin to
derive intrinsic value from expressing their identity in correlation to the common interests
o f the group they are interacting with.
Social media enables individuals to obtain a vast amount of information about
each other. In gaining a considerable amount of information they are able to become
engaged in collective action with those that share the same norms (Ostrom, 2000).
Furthermore, social media networks diminish the psychological barrier of fear enabling
for the people to communicate with one another and develop intrinsic values that are
essentially backed up by free access to the Internet. “Psychological research provides
evidence that intrinsic motivation is diminished when individuals feel that their own self
determination or self-esteem is adversely affected” (Ostrom, 2000, p. 9). Therefore, the
Internet allows for people to feel like they are a part of something and to feel supported
by instantly receiving feedback on how many people are involved or feel the same way
and how they are willing to act to reach the common goal. For instance, Facebook gives
instant feedback when witnessing how many people click with their computer-mouses
that “yes” they will attend a certain event or “yes” they do essentially “like” that idea.
“Institutions that enhance the level of information that participants obtain about one
another are essential to increase the capacity of individuals to solve collective-action
problems” (Ostrom, 2000, p. 10). The Internet provides a space where self-esteem is
fostered and the individuals feel that they have the freedom to act, which essentially
increases self-determination.
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Today, large protests around the world are using digital media to enhance
communication beyond sending and receiving messages. The emergence of digital media
as a tool to communicate heightens the aspect of communication becoming a prominent
part of the organizational structure, specifically in social movements. By sharing personal
information across media networks, people are forming collective identities and forming
the new argument of connective action.
As seen within the Arab Spring movement, individualized orientations result in a
direct engagement with politics as an expression o f personal struggles, grievances,
lifestyles, and hope. With the access to various technologies and social networks,
numerous individuals can organize collectively and personalized action groups are
formed. Personalized action formations is where the ideas and mechanisms for organizing
action become more personal on the basis of social group identity, membership, or
ideology (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Group identity becomes a vital influence within
collective action as people develop political identifications based on their given
circumstances and personal lifestyles. The identity is derived from an all-encompassing
and diverse large-scale personal expression (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), rather than just
a common group identification highly influencing people to join actions in large
quantities.
There is a shift between group-based to individualized societies that are
complemented with flexible social “weak tie” networks first argued by Granovetter. The
social weak tie networks enable the navigation and ability for identity expression within
complex and changing social and political settings (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).
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According to Granovetter’s argument the social weak tie networks enables individuals to
also navigate from group to group. Furthermore, two components of personalized
communication that are important within large-scale connective action formations are:
political content and various personal communication technologies (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2012).
In the 21st century, large-scale protests are now using digital media establishing
hybrid relations with organizations and enabling increased personalized public
engagement. Communication is becoming an essential mechanism for organization and is
heightened within social and digital media. Today, the use of digital media to create
social networks and communicate various viewpoints has become a focal point for
coordinating action of individuals and organizations; furthermore, the technology within
digital media creates a highly personalized and socially mediated communication process
that is fundamental to the organization of connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).
There is not one simple or general theory for collective action. Rather, collective
action can be perceived as a broader theory of human behavior, the existence of various
collective goods, the attributes of groups that affect individual behavior, and diverse rules
that affect individual behavior (Ostrom, 2000). Mancur Olson did not take into account
the aspect of identity within his collective action argument and focused more on the
instrumental willingness o f individuals to take action in order to ensure a share of the
common good (Jones, 2007). Therefore, Olson’s argument remains inadequate to
examine contemporary revolutions as it focuses on the self-interest of the individual,

38

rather than the factors influencing an individual to act. Within the Egyptian Revolution
the collective behavior transformed into a social movement.
Collective behavior within social movements is a complex effort in response to a
disposition that needs to be bypassed, the translation of feelings and ideas into actions,
and that this action then takes place collectively rather than singly (Turner & Killian,
1997). A social condition rather than a miniscule event is necessary for the focus of the
collective movement. Furthermore, this social condition must be perceived as amenable
and achievable in order to convince people to act for change. Complex communication
and decision-making structures are then necessary to facilitate the cooperation and reach
a vast number of the population surrounding the movement (Turner & Killian, 2007).
Mancur Olson failed to take into account complex communication structures, as
well as intrinsic motivations needed to foster the common interest and collective identity.
The Egyptian Revolution disproved Olson’s argument that individuals will not
collectively act in large numbers. Rather, more than a million people gathered in Tahrir
Square demanding the resignation of Mubarak and ultimately striving for democracy and
an end to police violence. Egyptians were able to communicate through social media to
form a collective identity and distinguish intrinsic motivations to collectively act. This
collective action transformed into a social movement as people were pushing against the
norms set by the government for change. Therefore, in order to fully understand the
impact of social media it is not only important to comprehend the factors affecting
collective action, but also the features in social movement theory that characterized the
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eighteen day Egyptian Revolution.
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CHAPTER 3
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY;
The mechanisms necessary to meet a common end goal

“In every oppressed person’s fight to be free, there is struggle, pain, and when successful,
pure jo y and celebration in that first penultimate moment when they realize success. ”
~Denis G. Campbell
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As the harsh circumstances in Egypt escalated, many citizens began to push
against Mubarak’s regime. In memory of the death of Khaled Saieed, a Facebook page
was made and became a communication technique for announcing the upcoming January
25th protest. Over eighty thousand people clicked with their computer mouse “yes”, they
would essentially attend the protest via the social media network Facebook (Khalil,
2011). However, clicking “yes” on a computer screen is completely different than leaving
the safety of your home and physically showing up and participating in a protest.
Anticipation was running high as many people were questioning exactly how many
people were truly going to show up and actively participate. Twitter became a
journalistic and communicative tool as people were using their cell phones to sum up the
events happening on the streets and willing each other to participate (Campbell, 2011).
Twitter allows for every person to become a journalist asking the essential question:
What is happening at this very moment? The social media network is an online service
allowing for an individual to share their thoughts and as each message is re-tweeted it
becomes viral across inter-connecting networks so as many people as possible become
aware of the issue or event taking place (Campbell, 2011). Following the example set by
Denis G. Campbell in his book Egypt Unsh@ckled, I will be using tweets taken from
Twitter o f events prior and during the Egyptian Revolution throughout this chapter and
the next in order to demonstrate the real-time affect social media had impacting the way
we all perceive and communicate the events spanning across the world.
The social media networks like Facebook and Twitter amplified the way people
were communicating with each other and becoming increasingly aware of the existing
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circumstances. Mancur Olson argued that people are self-interested and rational and
would therefore not be willing to act collectively unless forced or within small groups.
However, as previously discussed, Mancur Olson’s argument proved to be inadequate as
there are various intrinsic motivations that encourage people to voluntarily participate in
collective action. These intrinsic motivations become clarified within social movement
theory as social movements represent central mechanisms at work for social change
(Buechler & Cylke, Jr., 1997). Social change occurs as people begin to act collectively
creating social conflict with an opposing force. Acting collectively individuals begin to
question the norms o f their society and their constant doubts stir unrest. Once this unrest
has been recognized and experienced by a vast amount o f people, social conflict becomes
inevitable.
@GSquare86 Tunisia, Egypt, A lgeria.. .let the revolution drums roll down North Africa!!
Down with all dictatorships
@DJAmenRa R T @GSquare86: W e will all take to the streets.. .2011 WILL be different
#Jan25 #Egypt (Campbell, 2011, p. 25).
An individual acting collectively has the ability to gain momentum, pushing an
idea into a movement. Individual expression has the ability to create an action that excites
everyone surrounding the individual creating a crowd like behavior that transforms into a
social movement. Similar to the argument presented by Granovetter, people act partly on
the basis o f calculation and primarily on the basis o f vague feelings believing they can
succeed in their objective and it is the time to act (Turner & Killian, 1997). Acting
collectively requires certain mechanisms including communication and social ties in
order to reach the common good. As people communicate with each other they are able to
form an intimate relationship that is needed to create social conflict and push for a social
43

movement. People develop similar understandings and norms concerning the current
circumstances collectively and then translate these feelings and perceptions into
collective action (Turner & Killian, 1997). A focus on an existing social condition is
necessary for collective action to occur. Similar to the argument of collective action
presented by Olson, social movement theories require communication and other
mechanisms for progressing a movement from an elementary collective group to a
specific social movement working towards a common goal.
In his article “Elementary Collective Groupings,” Herbert Blumer (1997) defines
three main elementary collective groupings. The first collective grouping is the crowd,
the second the mass, and lastly the public. The characteristics of each collective group are
different from one another with some overlapping similarities that allow for one group to
become the other. For instance, a crowd begins to act by developing understandings and
relationships, a mass by various individuals becoming loosely organized and converging
ideas, and a public by reaching a collective opinion or decision (Blumer, 1997). All three
elementary collective groupings operate outside of a society’s structures or rules, norms,
and culture. Overall, these groups are spontaneous forming in response to the existing
circumstances and as a prelude to social change as new forms o f collective behavior and
social life are continuously forming.
A social movement in its most basic form is a crowd of people. In the occurrence
o f an exciting occasion a multitude o f people become interested and move towards the
transpiring events. W ith the attention solely on the event the individual is likely to lose
some self-control and become transfixed with the event itself. Herbert Blumer (1997)
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writes that the experience of such an event establishes tension that presses the individual
to act out. With a number of people stirred by the same event and excitement as the
individual the crowd begins to form.
The Egyptian Revolution was the result of increased corruption from the State,
the previous revolution in Tunisia, youth unrest due to financial hardship, increasing
unemployment rates, anger at the false attempts for democracy, and the cruelty o f the
emergency rule that was exemplified through the brutal death of Khaled Saieed (Khalil,
2011. & Campbell, 2011). With increased tension among the Egyptian people there was a
plethora o f events that excited the citizens encouraging them to form small crowds that
engulfed each individual’s self-control as they developed cat-and-mouse tactics for
protests that had the potential of turning violent. The unrest of the Egyptian population
increased tension within the State becoming an explosive that was ready to ignite under
the right circumstances.
A year before the revolution, Khaled Saieed was brutally killed by members of
the secret police. The post-mortem photograph of Saieed was released on the Internet and
quickly went viral. Google executive Wael Ghonim created the Facebook page “We are
all Khaled Saieed” in memory of Khaled Saieed, as well as against the emergency laws
and police violence that existed throughout Egypt. The death and photograph o f Khaled
Saieed stirred-up high emotions o f anger and outrage across the entire State as both
young and old citizens began to defy the government’s ‘no assembly’ law and demand
accountability for their actions (Campbell, 2011).
@Ghonim Over 1000 people are protesting now in Alexandria blocking the
street.. ,#KhaledSaid is me, you, and everyone (Campbell, 2011, p. 31).
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The death of Khaled Saieed was an event that stirred many people as a virtual crowd
began to form through the social media sites like Facebook. Within the virtual crowd
many people became anxious and excited as across Egypt everyone was stirred and
motivated through Saieed’s post-mortem photograph. Facebook and Twitter spread the
photo virally and mainstream media picked it up and ran the story across the nation.
Facebook and Twitter became the vehicles for communication and amplified the milling
process.
@Souihli Change will not come if we wait for some other person or some other time. We
are the ones w e’ve been waiting for. [Barack Obama] (Campbell, 2011, p. 29).
The second stage of the crowd, developed by Blumer (1997), is the milling
process where people being caught up in the movement begin to move around and talk to
one another about the events that are taking place. “The excitement of each [event] is
conveyed to others, and, as we have indicated above, in being reflected back to each
other, is intensified” (Blumer, 1997, p. 73). By communicating with one another a
common attitude begins to form among the crowd stimulating each individual to act in a
collective set.
In the events leading up to the revolution, Egypt had over 20,000 subscribers to
Twitter which is approximately one percent of the globe’s users (Campbell, 2011). In
using Twitter to communicate with one another the Egyptian subscribers became a part o f
an interlocking web of interconnected users making the events prior to and during the
Egyptian Revolution go viral— meaning they spread quickly. The social media networks
became organization tools as the Egyptian youth began to organize the January 25th
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protest, choosing the day intentionally as it was declared a national holiday in honor o f
the Egyptian Police (Campbell, 2011). Rallying around Khaled Saieed, the media was
alerted to the transpiring events and all that was needed was for the people that clicked
“yes” to attending the protest to actually show up.
@nelaontherun TIME.com: 85,000 Facebook users pledge to attend protests
tomorrow Jan 25, 2011 in Egypt #tunisia #activism #politics (Campbell, 2011, p.36)
Deriving from the milling process is the ability for the group to become an active
group. As an acting or active group the common attitude is focused onto one objective.
Herbert Blumer (1997) identifies that this objective usually revolves around an image that
has been built-up by people communicating with one another and ultimately becomes
shared by the crowd. In having a shared objective the crowd is able to act in unison and
with a purpose to achieve the common good. A week before the protests took place, on
January 18th, a twenty-six-year-old veiled woman posted a four minute YouTube video
that instantly went viral (Khalil, 2011). The young protagonist and active founder of the
April 6th movement, Asmaa Mahfouz, used direct language to emphasize that the
upcoming protest was a simple call for national honor and dignity. In her video she
speaks to the Egyptian citizens:
Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire thinking maybe we can have a
revolution like Tunisia. Maybe we can have freedom, justice, honor, and human
dignity.. .We want to go down to Tahrir Square on January 25th. If we want to
have honor and want to live in dignity then we have to go down on January 25th
(Khalil, 2011, p. 131).
Through her YouTube videos, Asmaa Mahfouz urges the Egyptian people to act with her
around the objectives o f honor and dignity— about regaining their own human dignity
and becoming a proud nation identifying themselves as Egyptians. Mahfouz demands that
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the people o f Egypt speak to their neighbors, colleagues, family, and friends to encourage
them to participate in the protest and take a stand declaring that “you are free human
beings” (Khalil, 2011, p. 132).
The first video that Asmaa posted on YouTube instantly went viral as many
people became inspired and motivated into action. The evening of January 24, Asmaa
Mahfouz posted another video that was seeking to ensure last minute fears and encourage
everyone to join her on January 25th. She speaks directly that:
All of Egypt waits for tomorrow. I know we are all nervous and anxious, but we
all want to see tomorrow’s event happen and succeed. I’d like to tell everyone that
tomorrow is not the day that we will change it all. No, tomorrow is the beginning
o f the end. Tomorrow we make our stand despite all that the security will do to us
and stand as one in a peaceful protest. It will be the first real step on the road to
change (Khalil, 2011, p. 133).
Asmaa speaks with encouragement believing that the protest will be a successful
beginning to what would become the Egyptian Revolution. Her viral YouTube videos
focused on a common attitude o f honor and dignity that was being restored back into the
Egyptian people—the pride that M ubarak’s regime slowly took away from them was
beginning to return. This common attitude was channeled into the people to form an
action and a cry that their demands be met.
The acting crowd, described by Blumer (1997), acts within the present lacking
established rules and important components o f society such as: a set o f norms, an
awareness of its own identity, and a recognizable “we-mentality” or consciousness.
Without the presence o f any established rules or norms the crowd acts on impulses. The
structures that stem from the acting crowd are derived directly from the milling process
and in projecting the objectivity as extremely important the acting crowd is organized
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around a central idea or image. Mancur Olson argued that people who collectively act do
so in small numbers in order to efficiently achieve the common good. However, within
the acting crowd the number o f people participating does not need to be confined into
small groups. Rather, the size of the crowd is irrelevant and the behavior of the acting
crowd may be found in a large or small group (Blumer, 1997). Similar to the acting
crowd and on a larger scale, the mass is formed by people who become aroused by a
nation-wide event.
The mass is composed of a multitude of people that vary in their class status,
careers, values, and beliefs. Thus, the mass group is composed o f anonymous individuals
who identify themselves within the mass group. William Kornhauser (1997) identifies the
mass society as being composed of an aggregate of individuals that are only related to
one another by their relation to a common authority that they are pushing back on.
Contrary to the acting crowd, the mass also has minimal interaction between the members
of the group (Blumer, 1997). By being anonymous and only identifying themselves
through the group, as well as commonly physically separated, the individuals do not
contain any opportunity to communicate with one another. Therefore, the mass is not able
to become successfully organized or move with unity and purpose (Blumer, 1997).
Without the technological tools of the Internet and social media websites, the
Egyptian protests would have integrated into a mass o f people. However, social media
avenues allowed for an effective form of citizen communication and journalism.
Ultimately, social media tools provided forums for ordinary citizens to document the
protests, spread the word of activities, provide actual evidence of what was taking place
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on the streets, and create a national identity (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). W ithout this
communication the members would form into a mass and lack the ability to act as a solid
unit. In lacking this ability people would begin to act as individuals disconnected from
one another. Deprived of the resources to communicate, as well as the resources to
restrain their own behavior the members would not be able to constrain the behavior o f
others, thereby losing any control or organization within the movement (Kornhauser,
1997). Therefore, unlike the acting crowd, the mass contains no unity consisting of only
an aggregation o f individuals.
Although the mass consists of individuals acting separately from one another,
these individuals are able to be acutely aware o f their surrounding and what is occurring
within the event (Blumer, 1997). Rather than acting in frenzy with those around the
individual, he/she will act in response to the objective that has gained his attention. Thus,
the individual will act on his own needs that are recognized in association with the
objective. Contrary to Herbert Blumer’s findings, William Kornhauser (1997) has found
that social atomization enhances feelings of alienation. Social atomization refers to the
separation o f individuals, as well as breaking them into small fragments so they cannot
formulate into groups. The mainstream media in Egypt functioned under strict
government supervision and control up until the mid-1990s (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011).
The media was mostly controlled by the government—M ubarak’s regime— in order to
keep most of the people uninformed and incapable in participating within the politics of
the state (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). This impacted the way people were able to stay
informed and thereby separated individuals. Furthermore, the emergency laws and the
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brutality of the police instilled a fear within the people further isolating them from one
another. Daron Acemoglu in the article “The Middle East and the Groupon effect” by
Freeland (2011), argues that “what really stops people who are oppressed by a regime
from protesting is the fear that they will be a part of an unsuccessful protest” (Retrieved
from Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 3). Living in the Egyptian regime people were afraid to
communicate with one another— only receiving information from mainstream media
controlled by the state— due to the increased violence performed by the secret police o f
Mubarak.
In correlation to the enhanced alienation there is an inclination for individuals to
become attached to symbols and leaders in order for them to feel like they have a purpose
and some sense of belonging within a group (Kornhauser, 1997). The introduction of the
Internet and social media networks within the mid-1990s was ironically due to the
Egyptian government wanting to use Internet proliferation and access as a means for
economic development (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Ironically, internet access was used as
a tool for individuals to communicate within a virtual community expressing their
resentment and frustration towards the regime as the regime itself was promoting Internet
usage (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Furthermore, the rise in social media usage followed a
rise in overall Internet and mobile phone usage.
@Ghonim Internet is the only free media in the Arab world. It’s the media that no
one controls. Thanks Facebook/YouTube/Twitter (Campbell, 2011, p. 33)
Over the last ten years prior to the Egyptian revolution, technology was increasing
at a rapid pace. The Internet was becoming a medium for the youth of Egypt to
communicate. Approximately fifteen to seventeen percent o f the population in Egypt who
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are active Internet users consisted of the youth, the 20 to 30 year old age group (Khamis
& Vaughn, 2011). The user-generated content is transmitted through popular sites like
Facebook, the video-sharing YouTube site, Twitter, and short message service (SMS) or
commonly known as text messaging (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). These social media
networks began to link the individuals together as they were becoming attached to
symbols or images like the post-mortem photograph o f Khaled Saieed.
@Zeinobia Khaled Said you may have been killed physically in 2010 but you
managed to become one of our greatest icons in 2011 bless you (Campbell, 2011, p. 31)
As social media was being used as a means for individuals to become attached to
symbols, individuals, or leaders the mass behavior was becoming more solidified.
Furthermore, when mass behavior begins to become more organized into a collective
action, it shifts into a movement becoming more societal or in other words becoming a
mass movement. Mass movements ultimately mobilize atomized sections o f the
population and lack internal structure of independent groups (Kornhauser, 1997). As the
Internet was solidifying the active internet users across Egypt to mobilize and hand out
flyers a week before the protest, more o f the atomized sections o f Egypt or those without
Internet access began to take part or at least become aware that something was about to
occur.
The last elementary grouping that Blumer (1997) identifies as a collective
grouping is the public. The public refers to a group o f people who are confronted by an
issue; however, these groups of people do not have any solidarity because they are
divided in how they want to address the issue, yet, are still willing to engage within the
issue (Blumer, 1997). Despite their dividedness, these groups of people are also willing to
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communicate with one another creating a collective opinion o f the issue. As a collective
grouping, the public comes into formation as a natural response to a situation; therefore,
the collective groupings o f publics will always vary according to the issue. For instance,
the issues of M ubarak’s regime and the nature of the police state were causing several
responses from the people. One popular response was the April 6th Movement organized
in 2008 by the youth using Facebook (Campbell, 2011). The online platform was used to
mobilize support for striking industrial workers from El-Mahalla El-Kubra. The youth
worked to promote democracy by encouraging public involvement within politics.
Another popular response was the creation of the Facebook Page, “We are All Khaled
Saieed” by Wael Ghonim in response to the brutal beatings of the police. Despite various
responses there was no denying that M ubarak’s regime was creating issues for the
Egyptian population. “And the fact that an issue exists signifies the presence of a
situation which cannot be met on the basis of a cultural rule but which must be met by a
collective decision arrived at through a process of discussion” (Blumer, 1997, p. 79).
Within the formation o f the public, it is necessary that communication be made possible
in order to ensure a collective opinion on the matter at hand.
@ ramyraoof tomorrow @ Cairo, April 6 movement is organizing a march. A network of
27 NGOs & about 50 lawyers are ready to provide (Campbell, 2011, p. 27)
Although the members of the public can hold discussions with one another there
is, however, no form of organization or collective identity existing. The very existence of
the public is derived from the issue and given circumstances at hand with varying sizes
and numbers of participants within the public. Lacking a collective identity and an
essential “we-ness” the public is characterized as having conflict relations creating
53

opposition within the group. Therefore, unlike the other elementary collective grouping
the public must reach a collective opinion or decision in order to form solidarity within
the group. However, the public is able to be transformed into a crowd when the
individuals participating in the public all become excited or touched by the same image,
sentiment, or propaganda (Blumer, 1997). Moving away from collective opinion and
towards collective sentiment, the public begins to mill and build rapport within one
another becoming a crowd. The public not only can transform into a crowd, but also into
a mass where members of the group begin to act more on an individual level than a
collective one. According to Herbert Blumer (1997), the increasing detachment of people
from local life, the multiplication o f public issues, the expansion o f agencies o f mass
communication, together with other factors” (p. 80) have all contributed to members
acting on an individual level. The important factor within all the groups remains to be
communication in order to increase solidarity and build a sense o f nationality to
overcome the issues and work towards a common end goal. Furthermore, the
communication that exists within the elementary collective groupings will enhance as
social movements begin to form essentially honing in on the issues that existed within the
crowd, the mass, and the public.
Social movements work to establish a new order of life from the current issues
and circumstances that people began to push on within the elementary collective
groupings o f either the crowd, the mass, or the public. Social movements revolve around
the dissatisfaction o f the current form o f life, as well as the hope for a new order o f life
(Blumer, 1997). Overall, there are three distinctive features: the occurrence of a
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disposition to transcend established institutional patterns or structures; the translation o f
perceptions, feelings, and ideas into action; action that takes place collectively (Turner &
Killian, 1997). In the beginning stage, social movements are poorly organized, lack a
unified group identity, and have limited methods for communicating that is normally seen
within the elementary collective groupings. Social movements are primarily characterized
by their impulsive behavior that is based on collective excitement, as well as a lack o f
any objective or a strategic way of thinking. Strategic thinking implies that there are no
organizational or small goals that can be recognized to reach an objective or end goal.
However, as social movements begin to progress they begin to resemble a society with a
clear organization and form, an established leadership and norms, as well as social rules
and values (Blumer, 1997). As a result of becoming more organized the social
movements develop solidarity and persistence to reach end goals. Three types of social
movements can be categorized as general, specific, and expressive. In examining the
characteristics and formations o f social movements the primary focus will be on specific
social movements because o f its focused objective in reaching a common end goal and
solidified identity.
Specific social movements are the manifestation of the hope for a new social
order derived from the dissatisfaction seen within the general social movement (Blumer,
1997). Moving away from a general movement towards a specific social movement, the
motivation is focused on a specific objective. Herbert Blumer (1997) writes that a
specific social movement is “one which has a well-defined objective or goal which it
seeks to reach” (p. 83). In trying to reach the movement’s well-defined goal it becomes
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more organized, recognizing a membership to the movement that essentially creates the
“we-ness.” In developing the “we-ness,” the social movement ultimately forms a body of
traditions, set o f values, set o f rules, expectations, and a loyalty to the group (Blumer,
1997).
Social media served as a channel for expressing collective consciousness and
national solidarity (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 3). The significance of the use of social
media was that it challenged the overall censorship o f the government providing a virtual
community that allowed for information to flow in and out freely. Social networking
allowed for the Egyptians to share their views with one another and more importantly to
see if their views were shared with other citizens within the state. Using this tool the
citizens were able to develop a “we” against a “them”—the “them” pertaining to
Mubarak and his secret police. Throughout M ubarak’s regime tension was mounting as
people became increasingly frustrated and resentful toward the government. Using the
virtual community these emotions were expressed and met by others, enabling the active
Internet users of the Egyptian population to form a common goal— for Mubarak to leave.
As Asmaa Mahfouz expressed; “W e’ll defend each other as one. W e’ll come prepared to
spend the whole day, or two days or even three days.. .no matter what they do to us, we
will not leave until our demands our met” (Khalil, 2011, p. 134). With this demand the
people o f Egypt began to form a specific social movement leading up to the date o f
January 25, 2011 and the eighteen day revolution.
The two primary types o f specific social movements include reform and
revolutionary movements that seek to make changes within the social order (Blumer,
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1997). A reform movement endeavors to modify a specific phase or a specific area of the
existing social institutions and structure. “It advocates a change that will implement the
existing value scheme more adequately than present conditions do” (Turner & Killian,
1997, p. 133) Contrary to the reform movement, a revolutionary movement pushes to
reconstruct the entire social order in order to build a new way of life. The revolutionary
movement challenges the fundamental values o f a society (Turner & Killian, 1997).
Furthermore, the distinction o f reform or revolutionary movements are important because
it corresponds to the strategies used within the movement and the way people talk about
the movements (Turner & Killian, 1997). The use of illegal or coercive strategies are
most commonly associated with revolutions and legal or socially approved tactics
correspond with reform movements. Despite a variety o f differences both reform and
revolutionary movements are dependent on the “we-ness” in order to manifest collective
behavior.
In increasing organization and “we-ness,” there are several stages categorized and
developed by C.A. Dawson and W.E. Gettys in their Introduction to Sociology (1935)
and further reevaluated by Herbert Blumer. The stages o f social movements include:
social unrest, popular excitement, formalization, and lastly institutionalization (Blumer,
1997). Furthermore, within each stage there exists a level of influence by developed roles
o f agitation, esprit de corps, morale, group ideology, and tactics (Blumer, 1997).
Complementing these developments are the ideals o f emergent norms, feasibility and
timeliness, and a sense o f hope that help the social movement for form and sustain
collectively (Turner & Killian, 1997).
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In the stage of social unrest, the individual participating within the movement are
restless and act spontaneously. There is a vital sense that some establishment or some
established mode o f thought is wrong and needs to be replaced. The first stage o f the
development of social movement is highly influenced by the role of agitation as people
become aroused. Essentially as more people become aroused there is more movement
and communication allowing for people to focus their restlessness on a more centralized
objective. The Egyptian people were becoming increasingly frustrated and agitated with
the degree o f corruption within the elections, dictatorship, economic distress, and
humiliation from M ubarak’s regime as various movements began to form in response to
these circumstances. These movements include the Kefaya or Enough movement, the
Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6th Movement, and other various political parties (Khamis
& Vaughn, 2011. & Khalil, 2011). Each organization and movement focus their energy
and restlessness on a centralized objective that they saw as a solution to the previous
issues listed.
@leloveluck E gypt election results are shocking, even given that we knew they’d
be neither free nor fair. Seems opposition won only 8 seats out of 518
@TravelSafety #Egypt: Election protests continue- Polling stations, cars set
alight. Police fire tear gas at protestors #egyptprotests (Campbell, 2011, p. 27)
The role of agitation pushes members of the social movement to enter the second
stage o f development—the stage o f popular excitement. As more and more people
become aroused and excited, they begin to communicate in a more direct way as they are
able to communicate their frustrations effectively placing significance on certain
objectives. The stage of formalization is considered to be the stage where the movement
becomes organized with rules, values, tactics, and discipline. The Egyptian activists were
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using the Internet to fight back and question the existing norms of the State prior to the
Egyptian Revolution (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). These activists were communicating
directly with one another through cell phones, blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in
order to organize meetings and protests, alert one another o f police movements, and
document police activity. Through this virtual community many activists were freely
expressing their discontent with the regime and police force.
@Advox Egypt: Using Online Media & Digital Devices to Release Detainees:
Earlier this month, the April 6 Youth M ovem ent.. .(Campbell, 2011, p.27)
In the last stage, the stage o f institutionalization, the movement has solidified into
an organization with a definite structure used to meet the ultimate end goal. For the
Egyptian Revolution this structure surrounded social media networks as a means for
organization and mobilization. Furthermore, specific social movements would not be able
to progress through the stages without the roles o f agitation, esprit de corps, morale,
ideology, and tactics. These means play a significant role in mobilizing and solidifying
the members of the social movement.
@Sandmonkey Guys, the Egyptian revolution has a Facebook event, so that even
the government can participate #KossOmelGhaba (Campbell, 2011, p. 25)
As seen within the first and basic stage of the specific social movement, the role
o f agitation is used to arouse and excite people into agents for the movement. The role o f
agitation is essentially used as a means “of exciting people and of awakening within them
new impulses and ideas which make them restless and dissatisfied” (Blumer, 1997, p.
84). A movement generally begins with the dissatisfaction and frustration experienced by
a group of people, ultimately the agitation is used to heighten those frustrations in order
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for people to break away from their conventional way of thinking (Blumer, 1997). For
instance, within a community people generally have a way o f thinking that revolves
around their local society’s norms, rules, culture, government, and general way of life.
However, when individuals become unhappy with their way of life from emerging issues
and circumstances they become frustrated. Agitation, therefore, allows for the individual
to become excited and aroused by the actions that are being taken to push against the
given circumstances. The events must first capture the attention o f the individual,
exciting and arousing impulses that lead them in a direction where they can
constructively convert the impulses into ideas (Blumer, 1997). Eventually, the excitement
experienced by one individual will arouse the same impulses in other individuals building
momentum for the social movement. This momentum will liberate people to wanting and
more importantly feeling the desire to act towards building a new way o f life that changes
the conceptions of what the people are entitled to as human beings. However, while
agitation sparks the movement into mobilization it would be short lived without the roles
o f other mechanisms to push the movement through all o f the development stages.
@GSquare86 we need to stop venting about “poor us” “we the repressed people” ..Go TO
THE STREETS don’t just write about it #Egypt (Campbell, 2011, p. 35).
Along with the role of agitation, the development of esprit de corps is important
for organizing the beliefs and feelings of the movement. Esprit de corps is the “sense
which people have o f belonging together and o f being identified with one another in a
common undertaking” (Blumer, 1997, p. 85). In order to ensure solidarity among the
movement, people must develop relationships and intimacy with one another as they
share a common experience. This is enhanced throughout the milling stage as people
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communicate with one another and spread their excitement and eagerness to generate
change. This mechanism is vital in the social movement stage because, for example, it
generates cooperation that is lacking in an elementary collective group like the public
where the individuals are divided and referred to having conflict relations. Furthermore,
unlike the mass, individuals develop a new conception o f themselves as a part o f their
participation among the other group members (Blumer, 1997).
The YouTube videos Asmaa Mahfouz sent out manifested the development o f
esprit de corps o f the Egyptian people. The young protagonist issued a demand to the
people of Egypt to come together as a nation and redeem their honor and dignity. In
calling upon each other to change their circumstances, individuals were able to form new
conceptions o f themselves taking pride in their nationality. A day after the Revolution
had begun, January 26th, Asmaa Mahfouz issued another video where she proclaimed that
she is proud to be an Egyptian (Khalil, 2011).
@Hawary #Jan25 People should not be afraid of their governments. Governments
should be afraid o f their people
@Elshaheeed We should all use one hashtag for our talk about the Revolution of
the Egyptian Youth, I suggest #OneEgypt #Egypt #Mubarak (Campbell, 2011, p. 41)
In relation to the development of esprit de corps, the development of morale
provides the persistence and motivation to meet the end goal o f the movement (Blumer,
1997). This mechanism is necessary because it provides the test needed to determine if
the specific social movement can withstand any adversity that may occur. The
development of morale is based on three sets of convictions including the “goodness” of
the movement (Blumer, 1997). The goodness or morality of the movement can be
answered by asking the question o f whether or not the end goal would produce a common
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good for the people that would benefit them and form a new way of life. The reign of
Mubarak ultimately had a corrosive effect on the people o f Egypt, making the citizens
feel helpless spreading apathy and cynicism (Khalil, 2011). M ubarak’s regime overall
instilled a sense o f hopelessness that nothing could be done to change the dynamic o f
their country. However, the days prior to and during the Egyptian Revolution the activists
using the Internet were able to develop a virtual online community where free speech was
welcomed. The capability to have free speech enabled people to realize that despite their
differences they all wanted Mubarak to step down and resign and with this resignation
they wanted democracy. The Internet and social media networks were used as a platform
for civic engagement where people could discuss with one another methods o f reaching
this common end goal that they deemed worthy of the protests and revolution.
@Gsquare86 There is nothing that #Mubarak can do now to prevent the madness that
will end his regime..IT WILL HAPPEN THIS YEAR!! #DownWithMubarak 2011
(Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p. 28)
The second component used to develop moral is the overall faith in the ultimate
attainment of its end goal (Blumer, 1997). The last conviction is that the movement is
sparked and motivated by a sacred mission (Blumer, 1997). In developing morale for the
movement, it is important to develop a certain type o f attitude that the movement is for
the greater good and that the end goal is worth reaching. Through the popular Facebook
page “We are all Khaled Saieed,” Wael Ghonim advocated that “this is your country; a
government official is your employee who gets his salary from your tax money, and you
have your rights” (as cited in Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 6). The Google executive’s
words inspired those communicating in the online community to realize the importance
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of democracy and working towards the resignation of Mubarak. The mission was to then
go out into the streets on January 25th to demand their rights.
@TravellerW Yes, I’m worried about tomorrow. Which is exactly why I am
going-we cannot, will not let them scare us. #25Jan (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p.
29)
The development of group ideology is necessary for the overall persistency and
progression o f the movement (Blumer, 1997). The ideology is constructed from a body o f
doctrine, beliefs, morals, and values. Herbert Blumer (1997) outlines the development of
ideology of consisting of a “statement of the objective, purpose, and premises of the
movement,” a “body of criticism and condemnation of the existing structure which the
movement is attacking and seeking to change” (p. 88). The development of ideology can
also be referred as a defense doctrine which justifies the movement and the objectives to
reach the end goal, “a body of beliefs dealing with policies, tactics,” as well as
operational strategies and the myths revolving around the movement (Blumer, 1997, p.
88). Usually, the development of ideology can take the form of symbols, phrases, and
arguments igniting emotions and impulses to act from those that are participating.
Ultimately, the development o f ideology is necessary for the formation o f direction,
justification, and hope that is needed throughout the stages o f the social movement.
@TravellerW our strength is in our collective action. Egyptians, Believe in Yourselves.
BELIVE IN US. #25jan #Egypt (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p. 36)
Through the use of the internet, Egypt had a vibrant communication environment
where activists could have their opposing voices heard. The best social network that was
used to build both morale and ideology was Facebook. Through Facebook information
could be spread to thousands o f people within an instance and then shared between
63

friends within seconds. The post-mortem picture o f Khaled Saieed became a symbol o f
the Egyptian Revolution igniting angry within the people and a motivation to seek
change. The “We are all Khaled Saieed” Facebook page was used as both a central space
for activists to communicate with one another, but also as a rallying point where the
psychological barrier of fear could be broken (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Furthermore,
during the revolution Tahrir Square became a space of unity, resistance, celebration, and
Egyptian pride becoming the ultimate symbol for the new developed Egyptian ideology.
@tarekshalaby Today’s our day as #CitizenJournalists to cover and share the truth freely.
Regardless of the outcome we are winners cuz w e’re a team #Jan25
@Sarahngb amazing sight as masses were coming from every direction towards Tahrir
square. It’s the demo’s meeting point. Amazing #jan25 (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p.
34 & 42)
The last mechanism needed for the progression of a specific social movement is
the role of tactics. The role of tactics involves gathering supporters and maintaining
advocates in order to reach the objectives identified throughout the movement (Blumer,
1997). The role of tactics will vary depending on the circumstances and issues that people
want to challenge and change. Tactics are highly dependent on the situation and
circumstances themselves and will, therefore, revert back to the cultural background o f
the movement (Blumer, 1997). The development of tactics, as well as agitation, esprit de
corps, morale, and group ideology are important steps in creating a social movement and
the overall public image of that movement.
In their article “Toward a Theory of Social Movements,” Ralph Turner and Lewis
Killian argue that once people become aware o f a movement, observers begin to assign
the movement an identity and image that serves as a reference for interpreting the events
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that took place (1997). The Egyptian social movement has been labeled as a revolution
pushing against the entire Mubarak regime. Consequently, in being labeled as a
revolution access to mainstream media in order to spread their demands across Egypt was
denied considering that the government controlled and censored most o f the information
projected from mainstream media (Turner & Killian, 1997). However, the youthful
activists used the Internet and social media networks to communicate their ideas and
form a virtual community of resistance. Social media became a powerful tool for the
protestors to organize and expose the corruption and wrong doings of the regime and the
movement has since been labeled as the Facebook and Twitter Revolution (Khamis &
Vaughn, 2011). However, although social media played a key role in the communication
and organization of the Egyptian population it was not until the blackout—the
government blocking Internet access—that more than one million people marched out
into the streets. Social media was merely an effective organizational tool as the power
and determination o f the Egyptian people to act and physically mobilize on the streets
contributed to the success o f the revolution.
@Ghonim They lied to us. Told us Egypt died 30 years ago, but millions of Egyptians
decided to search and they found their country in 18 days #jan25 (Edited by Idle &
Nunns, 2011, p. 218)
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CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL MEDIA, COMMUNICATION, & IDENTITY;
As seen during the Egyptian Revolution

“I f you want to free a society, just give them Internet access” ~ Wael Ghonim
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Mancur Olson’s argument in 1965 was that individuals will not collectively act
towards a common good unless the number o f the group is small or there is coercion to
force individuals to act within the common interest (Udehn, 1993). Mancur Olson’s
argument proved to be inadequate as it did not take into account that people will
communicate with one another forming bonds and relationships necessary for the
formation of social movements. Traditional theories of collective action lacked the key
communication possibilities and identity formations that are enhanced by information and
communication technologies, like the internet and social media networks, influencing
people to act collectively. Olson’s theory lacked acknowledgement of intrinsic values and
the realization that individuals will act in various ways. Individuals contain mixed
motivations defined as either self-interest, altruistic, or based on moral or social norms
(Udehn, 1993). These motives also help to characterize the intrinsic values of individuals
acting collectively that ultimately help to form a collective identity. These key elements
are all fostered through the Internet that helped to further characterize the protests as a
social movement.
Social movements are formations of collective behavior that contain three
distinctive features: the occurrence of a disposition to transcend, turning feelings and
ideas into action, and finally the action that exist occurs collectively reaching towards to
common goal (Turner & Killian, 1987). Furthermore, because social movements are
based on individuals collectively acting together it is necessary to have a process o f
milling or communication established in order to facilitate cooperative action. Ralph H.
Turner and Lewis M. Killian (1987), argue that both formal and informal communication
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networks are essential. Communication is the central power within contemporary society
that can stimulate change, transforming frustration into the desire to act.
Social movements require elements of organization in order to form a collective
identity where the members would be held accountable, as well as a means o f
organization for people to feel solidarity with one another. The historical events o f Egypt
and M ubarak’s regime created the conditions for the people in Egypt to feel dissatisfied
and frustrated; however, the internet and access to social media allowed for people to
interact amplifying a collective identity and increasing the process of communication.
Ultimately, the eighteen day revolution began with text, Twitter, YouTube, and
Facebook. The specific social movement from Egyptian revolution stems from the
solidification o f the motivation and the willingness o f the Egyptian people. The Egyptian
population were experiencing an excessive amount o f dissatisfaction and frustration from
the regime that ultimately fueled their desire to act towards a common end objective—to
see the resignation of President Mubarak. In a 60 Minutes report on CBS News, Wael
Ghonim remarks that the regime woke up eighteen million Egyptians (CBS News Online,
2011). Although the revolution has been characterized as the Facebook or Twitter
Revolution, it would be inadequate to say that social media was anything more than just
the tools to organize the people. Social media amplified and magnified the revolutionary
process; however, it was the physical interaction o f the people to march into the streets
that allowed for the revolution to become a success.
Over the past decade information and communication technologies have become
indispensable in providing a vast amount o f information to people, as well as new
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communication capabilities that allow people to communicate with one another in real
time via instant messaging or video-conferencing. Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) provide access to information through telecommunications that is
primarily focused on communication technologies including the Internet, wireless
networks, cell phones, and other communication mediums ("Techterms.com," 2010).
Furthermore, social media networks like Twitter and Facebook are user-generated
websites that allow for people to remain in contact with one another while
communicating and sharing information with one another. Overall, modern
communication methods and access to the Internet have changed the way people
communicate with one another and the way they collectively act in social movements.
The eighteen day Egyptian Revolution was a great story that we were able to
witness up close in real time via the television and the Internet. “This story was always
real, live, factual and never changed. It was about a group of people wanting to breathe
free. It played out in real time over 18 days and was mostly uninterrupted by a
commentariat trying to explain what it was they thought you saw” (Campbell, 2011, p.
10). As the Internet and social media websites began to develop, similar like-minded
people began to communicate with one another when communication or assembly
outside of the virtual community could subject them to arrest or detention. Twitter
became a journalistic tool as people became willing to go onto the streets during January
and February of 2011 to capture the unfolding events with their cell phones and tweet to
the world the circumstances that were taking place (Campbell, 2011). Howard (2011)
recognized that social media allowed for citizens to become journalists who are
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dissatisfied with traditional media and their perspective of events. Therefore, social
media enabled for citizens to tell their own stories, creating a democratic environment of
free speech. Activists using the Internet and social media sites like Facebook channeled
one of the most dangerous of elements— rage.
In their article “Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the Contemporary Media
Environment,” Bimber et al. (2005) argue for a new form of collective action that is
reliant on technological aspects addressing interpersonal interaction, as well as what is
ultimately used for the engagement shapes the overall interaction. Challenging prominent
collective action theories since Olson’s argument in 1965, the authors address the choices
of participation that was originally assumed to rely on strong ties and a formal or
traditional organization method that is necessary for locating and contacting participants
(Bimber et al, 2005). Furthermore, they argue that collective action is more of a concept
that crosses between private and public domains, rather than just existing within the
public domain (Bimber et al, 2005). The internet creates a medium for collective action to
cross between private and public domains building both online and offline networks that
essentially create the informal and formal networks necessary to sustain a social
movement (Aouragh, 2012).
The internet was a means for activists to communicate by using user-generated
websites and other sites such as emails, blogs, twitters, and text. The internet ultimately
created a space where people could become semi-activists in order to contribute and
participate within the movement. The internet became a tool in which communication
could facilitate cooperation by eliciting information about the choices and decisions of
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others, enhancing trust and transparency between participants, amplifying social values
and responsibilities, and lastly creating a group identity (Udehn, 1993). In using user
generated sites to communicate, human agency is overall made possible by social
structures that are conditioned from the users (Bhaskar & Callinicos, 2003; cited in
Aouragh, 2012). Therefore, in echoing Miriyam Aouragh’s argument in her article
“Social Media, Mediation, and the Arab Revolution” (2012), the internet and social
media can be perceived as both a space for activists to use and a mechanism to enhance
communication.
On February 9, 2011, 30-year-old activist Wael Ghonim commented in a CNN
interview that “if you want to free a society, just give them Internet access” (Khamis &
Vaughn, 2011). Many people believe that ICT positively promotes democracy and
freedom by generating the essential tools and spaces for people to participate in— giving
people the ability to effectively communicate their wants and needs forming a discussion
that could be reached to find a common objective. For instance, on the popular Facebook
page “We Are All Khaled Said” dedicated to the death of Khaled Saieed and to end
police violence, many people began to post about other maltreatments performed by the
police on Egyptian citizens. These stories began to shape the page to become a statement
against torture in Egypt, as well as inhuman treatment of Egyptians within their own
country (Facebook page We Are All Khaled Said). Furthermore, the stories emphasized
the ideal that everyone was Khaled Saieed, everyone could become a victim to the police
brutality, and it was time that these stories came into light to fuel the motivation to act
against M ubarak’s regime. Overall, the participation from the people of Egypt sharing the
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information formed a common anger, rage, and frustration at the police and the regime.
This common emotion could then be shaped into a common objective for the community
to become motivated to act upon.
The revolutionary movement grew largely out of anger at a permanent state of
emergency laws, unemployment, and rampant police abuses (Campbell, 2011). As the
Internet grew it exposed people to information and communication networks. However,
for many Egyptians a computer was too expensive to own and for years young Egyptians
were using their cell phones to take videos, pictures, and to send text messages. Towards
the beginning of the revolution many youthful activists began using social media like
Facebook and Twitter connecting across the state (Campbell, 2011). Social media sites
encouraged users to form groups becoming a dominant mode of engagement. Social
media tools could send out graphic images and organizing messages more quickly and
effectively than ever before.
“Online activism facilitates offline liberation strategies” (Aouragh, 2012, p. 529).
In order to understand what the activists are pushing on social media networks, it is
important to realize the political and historical actions that are taking place in offline
networks. Prior to the revolution, there was consistent turmoil existing within the
country leading to people feeling frustrated and dissatisfied. These events had a major
effect on the politics that were taking place in the online communities as people began to
share their experiences. The widespread anger and the increasing percentage of the
unemployed, as well as price increases all played a vital role leading to the tipping point
of the revolution. Technology was of essential importance in projecting these conditions.

72

Technology enabled people not only around Egypt, but around the world to fully
visualize the events that were taking place rather than analyzing the realities existing
within Egypt.
The Internet amplifies important aspects in social movements including
scalability—the expanding of social ties— and operational continuity or how the social
movement can sustain itself (Castells, 2009; in Aouragh, 2012). As a tool for activists the
internet is used as an operational factor and as a space it is used for expanding networks
(Aouragh, 2012). The online spaces for interaction intensify the political agendas of
everyone retrieving its sources from the political networks and physical, collective
protests that are taking place in the actual community— outside of the virtual realm.
Social media networks were especially useful in communicating and expanding networks
because they were both user-generated and malleable to the experiences of the people in
Egypt, as well as the application for everyday communication by the younger generation.
The social media spaces provided platforms for online public spheres that were
convenient for political deliberation and where opinions are shaped leading to unanimous
decisions (Aouragh, 2012).
Miriyam Aouragh (2012) argues that the Internet is also a dichotomy that
empowers and disempowers the people of Egypt as both the government and the people
use the space to gain power on information. Both the government and the activists used
the internet for gaining imperative information about the other. During the revolution
people were using social media, cell phones camera, and text messages to avoid the
police, as well as speak with and gather up other marchers across the densely populated
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city of over seven million people (Campbell, 2011). The Tuesday morning, the first day
of the revolution which would be known as the Day of Rage, was a day of transition from
the planning amplified by social media to the execution. As the morning progressed key
Tweeters alerted protestors of the location of the police, as well as to misdirect the police
themselves sending them false information.
@ManarMohsen Those tweeting about the protest in Egypt, please use the
hashtag #Jan25 in order to spread any information (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p. 33).
@gharbeia Police on every street entrance in Garden City, also in front of
Parliament
@adamakary reports that ppl have already started protesting down dar es sallam
st, shouting long live Egypt, freedom and bread for all Egyptians #jan25 (Campbell,
2011, p. 47)
However, the protestors were not the only ones using twitter. The police were
using fake twitter IDs in order to misdirect the protestors and manipulate them into
getting them to do or follow where the police wanted them to (Campbell, 2011). The
following tweets emphasize how important citizen-journalists like Sandmonkey and
Salamander were trying to communicate to other people the locations of the police. These
Twitter accounts were trusted among the activists to give accurate details about what was
occurring especially during the times the police would use fake twitter IDs to manipulate
the protestors.
@Salamander Security surround protestors in Cairo and Asuit #jan25 via front to
defend Egypt protestors
@Sandmonkey M ore police trucks at mostafa Mahmoud. People almost
nonexistent. #jan25 (Campbell, 2011, p. 50)
“The overwhelming materiality of power over technology in capitalist nation states— a
power of structure itself was practiced during the internet shut-down in Egypt at the start
of the revolution. Showing us just how ‘free’ the free market is” as companies worked to
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comply with governmental orders and shut down the access to the Internet (Aouragh,
2012, p. 528). The only company left with access to the internet was Noor since they
worked on the stock exchange. This indicates that while the Internet is deemed to be the
ultimate means for reaching freedom it, however, has limitations in that access to the
internet is politically and economically dictated by the state. Thereby, the state can
determine when its citizens will have access to the internet and the overall ability to
communicate state-wide. Overall, the social media sites built on expanding the social ties
of participants of the movement, the local citizens, and people all over the world. During
the revolution it built a solidarity that spanned across the globe. However, when access to
social media sites were denied people began to mobilize in an effort to sustain the social
movement.
The crowds of Egyptians continued to gather the morning and afternoon of
January 25th communicating with each through Twitter and other social media sites until
the Internet began to jam. Suddenly protestors within Tahrir Square did not have any
access to Twitter, as well as mobile networks like Vodafone went down (Campbell,
2011).
@itsBuddhaBlaze E gypt has blocked twitter? You cant block what people want in
masses? Its called democracy!
@fouad marei via @Salamander #Egypt #Mobinil suspends mobile coverage
service for subscribers in Tahrir Square, helps censor protest #jan25 (Campbell, 2011, p.
60)
Wael Ghonim declared that the regime made a stupid strategic mistake when they
blocked the access to Facebook because the regime sent the message that they were afraid
of what the people of Egypt could do (CBS News Online, 2011). When the government
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blocked the access to Facebook, many citizens began to use pre-digital technologies such
as dial-up modems to gain Internet access to maintain network and continue organizing.
Although social media was an important mechanism for the development of the
revolution, technology was only actually used by several factions critical to the
revolution and Facebook became less relevant once people were already in the streets
(Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). While online tools like SMS text alerts, Google maps, and
Twitter were important for coordination, citizen journalism, and mobilization, the
blackout emphasized the crucial role played by the physical on-the street mobilization
before and especially during the revolution (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Idle and Nunns
(2011) recognize the importance of the physical numbers as they observed how protestors
would walk down the streets calling out to people as they went while tweeting about their
location and the unfolding of the events.
@GSquare86 I am not comfortable with all this talk on #Jan25 on social networks, it
better show on the streets.. .I will be there, will u? (Campbell, 2011, p. 41)
Although January 25th was the start to the Revolution and the start to the jamming
of the Internet, on January 28, 2011 the Egyptian government shut off the Internet and
mobile phone services for the entire country resulting in a blackout that lasted for over a
week (Khalil, 2011). The blackout forced the activists to find more innovative ways to
communicate with each other and the rest of the world as they used landlines to connect
to internet services in neighboring countries, used Morse code, filed transfer protocol
accounts to send videos to international news organizations, and created a Speak-2-Tweat
service where users could call an international telephone to post and hear Twitter
messages (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011).
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The government’s choice to shutdown Internet access overall backfired as it
enraged Egyptians who were accustomed to using the Internet. “Young, educated,
Egyptians were affected by their years o f access to the Internet, which shaped their
outlook and connections to each another and led to a sense of entitlement to Internet
access” (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 11). The barrier of fear was essentially broken and
activists became resilient and determined.
@GSquare86 I have Internet access from an unknown location, the people are in
MILLIONS in the streets and will NOT stop until MUBARAK is OUT!
@GSquare86 The government has blocked everything because they are soo
afraid, but the people are not and will not give u p!! (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p. 67
8)
W hat the regime realized too late what that Facebook could have been seen as a
distraction as people were spending too much time participating in virtual activism rather
than real activism. Therefore, when the government shut down access to the Internet
there was a surge of real activism as people had to move outside of their homes and
virtual communities into the streets of the protests. “The regime realized too late that
many, if not most, of the people in the streets were not Internet users. In fact, some of the
protesters in Tahrir Square have never heard of Facebook before, but they were energized
and inspired by the huge numbers of people” (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 11). Since the
blackout, the citizen journalism that was taking place on the streets and told by using
Twitter, became more for the world to know Egypt’s story and struggle, rather than for
the people in Tahrir Square who could not even easily read the tweets.
Clay Shirky (2011) remarks that as:
Communications landscapes get denser, more complex, and more participatory,
the networked population is gaining greater access to information, more
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opportunities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake
collective action. In the political arena.. .these increased freedoms can help
loosely coordinated publics demand change (cited in Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p.
15).
Activists using the Internet in Egypt were able to use social media effectively to express
themselves, share information, organize protests, and ensure that their story was told and
heard by millions spanning across the globe. The momentum of the Egyptian Revolution
was characterized by collective actions built upon networks rather than institutions or
political organizations. Social media enhanced the ability for people to mobilize and act
collectively in an expression of the public’s common desire to see the resignation of
Mubarak.
Social media empowered activists to associate and share their ideas with others
globally and amongst themselves. The Internet and social media created a space for free
expression seen on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and blogs. Furthermore, access to social
media sites allowed for protestors to plan, organize, and execute peaceful protests
(Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). The blackout of the Internet access further revealed the
determination of the people themselves to physically act and protest within the streets of
Egypt to characterize the social movement.
Wael Ghonim spoke to CBS News Online in the 60 Minute segment (2011,
February 13) that “Without Facebook, without Twitter, without Google, without
YouTube, this would have never happened.. .If there was no social networks it would
have never been sparked.” Social media and technology does not cause political change,
but it did provide new opportunities for organization, mobilization, and group identity
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(Howard, 2011). Social media gave the Egyptian population a chance to become cyber
activists.
In intertwining ways, the Egyptian Revolution enabled a population to become
citizen journalists and cyber-activists, becoming a trigger for street activism that was
emphasized through the blackout, which finally encouraged civic engagement (Khamis &
Vaughn, 2011). Cyber-activism is the act of using the internet to advance a cause that
would otherwise be difficult to advance outside o f online communities (Howard, 2011).
Using the internet to advance a cause can consequently promote civic engagement where
the whole of society is invited to participate in the social efforts to bring about change.
Once the government blocked access to the Internet the civic engagement was amplified
as citizens poured into the streets and collectively worked together to have their demands
heard.
From the theories of social movement we know certain elements like agitation,
the development of group ideology, the development of morale, and the development of
esprit de corps are essential. Utilizing social networking spaces, such as the “We are all
Khaled Said” Facebook page, the activists were able to share posts and messages that
enhanced the elements o f social movements and ultimately encouraged those on the sites
to become mobilized. Without the posts, pictures, and videos uploaded onto popular sites
such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter the revolution would not have been experienced
with the same intensity and have ended as quickly as eighteen days with the resignation
of President Mubarak. However, it was the physical interaction and emphasis of civic
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engagement through on-the-street activism that encouraged people to actively participate
shown within the sheer numbers of people pouring into Tahrir Square.
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CONCLUSION
AN ENDGING WITH ALL OF EGYPT

@syazwinasaw It began with Khaled Saieed, facilitated by Wael @Ghonim and
Facebook, and ended with all o f Egypt. A story for our children. Inspiring. ~Twitter
Retrievedfrom Campbell, 2011
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On the eighteenth day of the Revolution the crowd’s rage was growing, as well as
their anticipation to see what would be M ubarak’s next move in addressing the citizens in
Egypt. Many citizens began to flood into the streets after witnessing the previous
speeches given by Mubarak, as well as the emotional interview of Wael Ghonim. There
were over one million protestors in Alexandria as the day was approaching into late
evening. Across the country the people were chanting Leave! Leave! Leave! to both
Mubarak and his government—the people had had enough. Tensions were high among
the crowd as people were unsure who was controlling Egypt—was it Mubarak or the
army? People continuously walked into the streets resulting in recorded estimates of over
ten million people gathering within the streets across Egypt participating in the massive
demonstrations (Campbell, 2011). Then finally the news of M ubarak’s resignation hit the
crowds gathering in Tahrir Square.

@nytimes Mubarak Leaves Cairo as Crowds surge #Egypt #Jan25
@Camanpour Suleiman sends less than 1 min statement: President Mubarak hands over
power to the military
@NigelCNNpr #BenCNN “One man listening on his phone shouted the President has
resigned and the crowd went wild” #CNN #Jan25
@mmcohen Mubarak steps down #Cairo has exploded in celebration. It is a good day for
#Egypt #Jan25 was worth it (Campbell, 2011, p. 296-7)
The night of February 11 turned into a night of celebration for the Egyptians as
the people celebrated the fall of Mubarak. Since the eighteen day revolution, people in
Egypt have continued to occupy Tahrir Square in protest of the Army and underlying
economic issues. When Mubarak resigned from office, cyber-activism did not end.
National issues are still being discussed and debated online, as well as through
mainstream media. The recent 2011 constitutional referendum was discussed throughout
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both mainstream and social media via newspapers, Twitter, and Facebook (Khamis &
Vaughn, 2011).
During the 2011 constitutional referendum debate many social media sites like the
popular “We Are All Khaled Saieed” Facebook page was polling members and
encouraging them to vote no to the constitutional referendum in order to draft a whole
new constitution for Egypt (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). However, the voters ultimately
voted yes passing the referendum for the new amendments to be added into the
constitution, rather than just drafting a new constitution. Many political activists believe
that this was in result to many people not being aware o f what the referendum to the
constitution stood for and that the military council did not allow for enough time for
citizens to learn about what their vote would go towards (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). As
social media continues to play a role in the political sector o f Egypt, it also plays a role
for civic debate as online activists create websites to encourage discussion and Wael
Ghonim’s Google Moderator that sketches where the future of Egypt may lie (Khamis &
Vaughn, 2011). Furthermore, since the revolution, more than two million Facebook
accounts have been created and used for citizens to communicate with one another.
Activists Dalia Ziada remarks that social media “will be vital in building a democracy
that respects the rights of women and minorities” who contributed to the vast numbers of
protestors during the eighteen day revolution (cited in Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 15).
Overall, social media will remain an important tool for citizens to work towards
democracy and equal rights.
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The final outcome of the Egypt Revolution and their transition to democracy
remains to be seen. Yet Egyptians and people around the world have learned about the
power o f social media and the Internet as effective organization and communication
tools. Furthermore, it is these tools that can be used to ensure democracy especially if the
Internet is granted access to everyone across the state o f Egypt.
Although social media will continue to play an important role in the transition for
Egypt to democracy, it is important to understand that this transition will mostly depend
on the people’s will and determination to continue to put pressure on the Egyptian
military council. As our world becomes increasingly linked through technology
transforming the way we collectively identify ourselves, organize, and act it is important
to remember the significance of physical interaction that enables us to develop deeper
connections. Through individuals becoming physically active within their communities a
deeper connection can be formed used to foster intrinsic values and identity— how we
identify ourselves on our own and in correlation to those around us.
There is a dichotomy that exists when using social media as it has the ability to
empower us, as well as disempower us. The world is becoming increasing interconnected
as technological advances and the Internet allow for us to have a vast amount o f
information within the click o f our computer mouse, the app on our smart phones, and the
capability to watch news and footage at real time. While studying abroad, I had the
opportunity to experience this first hand. Living in a different country was both terrifying
and exhilarating as I both missed my friends and family, yet was anxious to form new
relationships. Today’s technology and access to the Internet gave me a plethora of
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opportunities to communicate and stay caught up with my loved one’s at home. This
capability empowered me to wield information and technology and use it on my will.
However, it also disempowered me for as I was communicating with those back home via
Skype and Facebook, I severely limited myself to forming new relationships and
immersing myself within a whole different culture.
From this experience I wanted to understand the dichotomy of social media and
how it was impacting our relationships and our surrounding communities. I questioned
what we owe to ourselves, to our relationships, and to our communities from our
privilege o f having access to technology and the Internet. As we have seen within the
Egyptian Revolution, social media has the capability to empower millions o f people by
dissolving a psychological barrier o f fear and creating a space for open conversation.
Ultimately, social media creates a space that enables people to communicate with one
another and share their experiences. Social media enhanced our ability to feel connected
and connection is what gives us purpose and meaning to our lives.
Through the Egyptian Revolution, social media networks like Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter allowed for the Egyptian people to connect after years o f isolation
fueled by the regime of Mubarak. M ubarak’s regime instilled an aspect of hopelessness
that made people feel that they were not good enough to belong, the Egyptian pride and
nationality was completely stripped from the people. Social media networks then created
a space for people to tell their stories and speak o f their own experiences with the regime,
ultimately creating a sense o f belonging and worthiness. The Egyptian people began to
believe that they were worthy and deserved more human rights that was not provided by

85

M ubarak’s regime. This sense of belonging stirred the people to communicate and create
virtual communities with one another.
Yet, social media was merely the tools to connect people and begin to form
among them a collective identity. As the government shut down the Internet, what moved
them onto the streets was not only curiosity as people wanted to know what was
happening, but also a sense o f courage. The barrier o f fear was resolved and within the
streets people were able to let go o f who they were under Mubarak and truly connect with
their surrounding community. Outside of the virtual communities, courage then becomes
the ability for us to tell our story of who we are with our whole heart. Once in the street
the citizen journalism enhanced by Twitter, became the way for Egypt to tell their story.
Although social media enhances our capacity to connect and hear in real-time the
events that are unfolding around the world, it also inhibits our ability to fully embrace
vulnerability that allows us to connect on a different level. The Internet encouraged a
sense o f nationalism and pride, as Egyptians reached out to one another asking for each
other to go out into the streets. However, as we now realize most of those in the streets
did not even know Facebook existed. So in order for one million people to have marched
into the streets they all embraced their vulnerability o f being excluded, re-finding their
own human dignity in a corrupt State, and demanding their rights. Gathering into the
streets and the willingness and courage to tell their story enabled for the Egyptians to
truly connect. I believe that social media limits our ability to be deeply seen and to share
our whole heart with others as it distracts us from our local surroundings. This connection
can only happen as we are fully active within our surroundings and communities.
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Furthermore, as we immerse ourselves deeply within our communities our story can
unfold as we begin to truly feel a sense o f belonging and find a purpose among one
another.
As we enter into a world that enables us to connect globally from the push of a
button on our phone, surf endless webpages to find like-minded virtual communities, and
receive a vast amount o f information it is important for us to realize the significance o f
civic engagement through the physical participation within our communities. The
Egyptian Revolution has been commonly referred to as the Facebook or Twitter
Revolution; however, what can be taken away from this movement is the willingness and
determination of a vast amount of people acting collectively to form change. People who
were willing to walk out into the streets and communicate on a face-to-face level in order
to truly comprehend and develop empathy for the demands echoing across Egypt. This
connection and perseverance by the people is what needs to be taken away as the
Revolution became a unique opportunity for the world to witness history taking place, for
the world to witness Egypt’s story.
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